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"A reason for the partial submergence of the economic 
motive in the effective publicity on internation&l re-
lations is probabJ~ to be found jn the less perfect recep-
t.i vity of the public to the drab details of wi_de corrmercial 
movements as contrasted witt its eagerness and capacity to 
gbsorb accolmts of the seemingly simple and heroic acts of 
great men. Biogr£pr'J is admi ttedl'y fasc~_nat i ng. Certain 
types of publicists have for this reason come todescribe 
history as somet~'ng of a dramA in which the fate of na-
tions is determ:1ned by the decisions of outstanding 
statesmen Who, for all that is said to the contrary, may 
have derived their ligbt from their inner consciousnesses. 
But, except in the new biography, heroes ~re philanthropic, 
idealistic, and humanitarian. They II1re not influenced by 
thoughts of mere gain. Hence, when we describe the acts of 
nfil.tions 1n terms of the deeds of famous indi viduals, the 
economic motive is often thrust unconsciously into the 
background. 
"The euphemist who overlooks economic realities is a 
poor pedagogue for he explains events in terms of a 
fictious causation. On the other hand, one sLould not be-
come doctrinaire on the subject of the economic deter-
mination of national policies. There are many different 
kinds of reasons for action. There are often po~erful 
psychological forces, springing from other than economic 
causes, which bear dovm upon foreign offices and state de-
pll1rtments and persull1de or coerce them into decisions. The 
function of the scholar is to sift what evidence he has 
3 
and to determine the motives as best he can with an un-
swerving loy~lty to the ideel of Truth."* 





If we look brief) y at the h1 story of Germany we see 
that fjfty years before the ~orld ~ar she was onJy a mass 
of small unorganized stetes. \";1 th t"he coming of Bismarck 
occured the unification of Germany into a Norld power of 
highest r~!TIk. '.:'hen the war began, Germany Wlas raf/idly 
approlilching B position of supl'emac), in Europe Bnd, in many 
respects, a position of suprem&:cy in the '.'Iihole vior-Id. In 
1914 Germliny WIiS in tbe full tide of industrial !?TId cor.:mer-
cial power. \Jut of~be half dozen prjncipal branches of 
modern :'industrial production, she had achieved double or 
more than double the output of England in iron and steel, 
mac:hinery, electro-technic!?l products, and chemicals. She 
1 ap:'ed onJ. y j n coal and in t e:xt ile production. her commer-
ci (;11 mercbant m9rine was rapidl y explmd1ng, the volume of 
her foreign trade was exceeded only by that of Englsnd. The 
United ~3t8tes 9] one was clear] y aheldd of her in theciorld 
industrial field, lmd had there been no war even tbe 
Americsn supremacy might soon have been chsllanged.* 
The Government of Germany, from tbe time of its unifi-
cation, had been a monarchy. At the time of its near-su-
premacy, 'rdlhelm 'NlilS tbe man in power. Bismarck bad m8de it 
his policy to sep tbat tbe whole of }.urope WfaS a group of 
monarcbies wlth Germany the strongest. If tlJis policy bad 
been continued &fter his dismissal, Germany would to-dB_Y 
probably be one of the world powers in more ways tban in 
nliime. 
J,~ Peter Reinhold - The Economic, Fin~ncial, and Folitical 




The French have always been Q direct contrbst to the 
Germans. rrhere is more than one r;~son for this stl;)tement. 
The nati()nQ] cl-):;.ractEr of the French is for economic sta-
b1lity and equilibrium Wi ich is considered sta.gnation by 
the Germans. The French, as a whole a logical thinking 
netion, th~nk in terms of the past, wbile the Germans, 
aspiring and ambiticus, think in terms of thf'l future, no 
mattpr tow obscure and uncertain it rna, seem.* 
1i:ith these facts in view 'NO cliln re9dily see why France 
was ready when the 1~;ar bet:8n. It is hardly logical to fix 
bere trle blame of t:he '/iar on either of these countries or 
any other country. he vertbeless, when it came about, France, 
according to her age-old policy of economic security, was 
fulJy prepared, having ~lmost given up her place in the 
industria) and commercial world by the ever-increasing 
rate of her rivals. In fact, the position of France in 
comr(;erce at the beginnlng of tbe war was unique. In the 
first pIece, most of the popuJation of France was engaged 
in agriculture, thus making France less dependent on trede 
for livelihood. In the second place, the c~aractpr of the 
Prench industries made her also independent as to competi-
tion with other countries. Her ind~stries consisted mainly 
of the luxury, art, and fashion t;ype, thus differing from 
Germany and all other countries • The above obl ip:ed France to 
import all tbe necessi ties such as macr,1nery, cotton, iron, 
and co~l. AI] these made up the conditicns before tbe war. 
Tf'_e tariff questicn before the -';'·ar was very interesting. 
France had a poJ icy of protE;ction tLat vvas constantl, 
K. Kalant~rian - The German Economic Policy 
----------------------~ 
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cbangjng from strict protection to almost free trade, 
according to the whjm of the 001itical group in power or 
of the economic condition of the country. Germany ma~n-
tained a pol icy of protection in :aJ 1 those channels -Nbere 
it seemed plGusible. You will recall that the unification 
of Germany was not only built on the tariff but was also 
made possible by it. 
The colonial policy of the two countries was the only 
phase in which they seemed to be similar. Both were for 
gaining as many colonies and as much territory as they 
could in other coUntries and for bu-Dding up, to the best 
of their abilities, their respective relations on as many 
as possible points on the globe. 
In respect to the merchant marine of the two countries, 
Germany was b~y fliir the superior. France unsuccessfully 
tried to increase the number of ber own merchant srips by 
a system of bounties. 
One other factor to remember before turnlng to the 
Treaty of VersailJes is that at the close of the Franco-
German ;\ar in 1870, when France was defeated, the Alsace-
Lorraine territory was taken by Germany and annexed. This 
strip of llmd was very valuable as will be seen] ater. Other 
ob] igati ons were thrust i)_pon France by her eternal foe that 
did not cause a feeling of subordination but rather one of 
revenge wili ch we see agBin at the 'llreaty of Versailles. 0\:-
---------------_.- •.... _._ .. --- -----_._-----'--
* Charles F. Horne, editor - The Great EV6nts by Famous 
Historians Vol. 18 
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Chapter 1 
From Compeigne to Paris 
On November the 11th the Armistice was signed bj 
Germany. rrhe fight ing of the V.orld Y:ar was brought to a 
c]ose. All the nations ttat had participated were in the 
ttroes of eXhaustion. Germany and Frf'nce were probably the 
most hard hit of the major nations. These two were wrecked 
--socis.lly, economi c f;ll 'j, fj mmc iall y, and commerci ally. 
Most of the fighting bad been on French territory and 
9.1] of this llimd bad been literally deVGst~.ted. The number 
of soldiers lost by Frf'nce while fighting Wll.S 1,385,000; 
40,000 civilianslNere slain; and the number of soldiers and 
civilis.ns wounded was 3,000,000. The total population of 
France Bt this time was 40,000,000. The cost of her prop-
erty destroyed WBS valued at ~lO,OOO,OCO,OOO. The national 
debt \I'I:'S ir1Cr'eased f rom ~6 blllions in 1913 to ~~30 billions 
in 1918. The net financial loss of France has been esti-
mated at ~24 billions. 
But before ~';e go on '.v:ith tr~e story, it is fitting to 
go back and look at the ';';Qr in its last stages, leading lJP 
to the Armtstice. 
On the 8th of January 1918, "oodrow ';ilson proclaimed 
his famous "Fourteen roints"~} Up to this time Germl,my had 
been making steady lH',advlay to victory. 'rhe >!estern Pront 
had been pushed forward Bt;ain Rnd at:a~n. Then came the 
United States, bringing an end to the GE:rm~n advance, bring-
ing a. world crisis and, £8 a re8ul t of t~ j 8 1 a.ttar, bring-
ing anarchy. The United St5te8 proclaimed the principle of 
justice to all fighting people. They supported democracy 
~:- Cooke ~nd ~:tickney, edi tors - Re.d1 ngs j n }uroJ;)el1n Inter-
nitional Rel~tions - page 546 
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and opposed Hn&rchy. The Allied powers immediately &dopted 
the American prj nciple land the ":F'ourteen Points". 
The first treaty m&de by opponents in the war was be-
tween Russia and Germany. (Rouman1a h8d signed a treaty but 
tba.t was a minor country.) The Germans, who had IiI. few weeks 
before heralded the American principles along with the 
J\llied PO':'iers in +;11e hopes of vdnning over t'ne United States, 
broke down and allowed the old methods of trE;aty making to 
hold. They tViisted the IIFourteen Points" around until they 
were 001 e to s ~.t i sfy all their .v ant s. 'rhey, figura ti vel y, 
divided HU8Si~ and put her in Sle}-) a position that tbe 
AIJies could no longer count on her even as a "benevolent 
neutral". Their triumpb over Russia so much encouraged the 
Germlilns tbat they still drelilmed of being the leaders of 
the world. The peace with Russia was cglled the "peace 
wittout annexations". This treat J1 on the part of Germany 
cOr"'!pJ ete] y won over the Am(-;ric~ms. ':11son said, "Force and 
conquest, massacre and desol <.: t ion, such a s the 'iVorld llad 
not known throu['h all the centuries of mod8rn civilization, 
against th~s was to be pictured the great f1nal drama of 
battle in ttle "jpst" .~:. The great German gen0ral, Ludendorff, 
had made aJ1 his plans. Four defjnite assaults were to be 
made on the line. tach had been carefully planned and no 
force had been omitted. 'fhe Itst ounce of strength ',nBS to 
be used. No reserve was saved in case of loss. It was the 
plan of the leadArs thgt if this f!'iled, there would be no 
use in further c8rrying on the '~,ar. It hard1y seems possible 
~~C.F. Horne-edi tor"Tbe Great Events of the Great '11'Qrll Vo]. 6 
pg.a.f 
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that human beings could have plotted out such a massacre. 
The first of this series of "Kaiser Battles" began at 
Pic2rdy. An attempt 'NSS Yl1l"lde to break the I lne at the point 
of British defense. This was the heaviest day of fight:lng 
of the 'jar. The British succeeded in hold:ing the line and 
the first of the "KBiser Battles" was a failure. 
The second battle was that of Lys on April 9,1918. 
The Br:i.tish were again attacked by the combined forces of 
the Germans Bnd their a}' ies in an attempt to cut off the 
British from the other Allies. This battle was almost a 
success for the Germans. The British line was broken and 
muct ground was lost before the retreat could be stopped. 
The third battle was thet of Aisne. This point was 
closer to 1)a1'is Bnd the F'rench troopsbroke their line and 
retreated. 'rhe Germans covered the ground rapidly and got 
within 40 miles of the French capitol before they were 
stopped. The Americans c:;;me to t11e rescue and the third 
great battle ended in failure. 
The last project of Ludendorff vias ctilled the "Peace 
Battle". He cRlled upon every reserve that remained, know-
ing that unless this battle W,"Si,on all 'Nould be lost. A 
terrific drive was started on the 15th of JuJy. This ended 
in defeat for the Germans. 
General Foch, commander of the Allied Nations' army, 
now began bis counter attack wbich lasted until the 8th of 
November when the Ger'11~lDS requested terms. Tbe German army 
officials are reported to have /asked for peace terms from 
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their government long before. They realized the disastrous 
resul ts that i1\fould follow, but the men in power failed to 
see anyUl:ing in thi s lip:ht. 'ftey S8';; hope for a gr~ater 
Germany in the dlm obscurity. hlthough these men failed to 
see defeat in tIle great project of Ludendorff, the mut1ny 
of the German navy at Ydel caused tliem to realize tIle 
futili ty of German success. l!.hen final1 y tc-'5rms ':!F're asked 
for, the Kaiser and ~rince Max abdicated, throwing the 
government into chaos. This could not, however, have made 
conditions any worse. 
Probably the only assets not destroyed in Germany were 
its natural resources and its national spirit. The economic 
structure had, durlng the past four years, been converted 
into a war machinery. Every possible resource had been 
renov£ted to 1'i t the war needs. ThUS, 'when the 'fiar closed, 
the economic s truc ture was compl eteT J' destro,; ed. 'fhe 
foundstion of this pirantic structure wes German finance. 
It was now in dire straits. All the securities, currency, 
gold (practically &]1 of this had been exported), ~nd 
savings had been wiped out. 
signed 
The terms of the Armistice at/Compeigne, November 11, 
1918, were very indefinite Bnd caused the complete dovmfall 
of Germany. They stated tha~ the terms of a treaty would be 
drawn up 'Nith the "Fourteen Points" of Vdlson as a basis. 
This much was agrEeable to the defeated. But the additional 
terms, such as the evacuation of all conquered territory, 
the repatriation of all prisoners, the surrender of the en-




of guns, aeroplanes, rolling stock, and arnmun5.tion, the 
return of Alsace-Lorraine, withdrawal beyond the Rhine, 
cancelling of the Treaties of Brest-litovsk Bnd Bucharest,* 
and, to complete the list, the full responsibility of 
causing the war, were very disQgreesble and humiliating to 
Germany. *~~ 
* The Treaty of Brest-litovsk was signed by Russia on the 
one hand end the Centra] Power& on the other on March :3, 1918. 
Its terms were equsl to the unconditional surrender of Russia. 
The Treaty of Bucharest was signed by ROQmania and the 
Central Powers on December 5,1917. 
These tVJo treaties imposed upon Roumania and Russia 
extreme mes.surps 2nd huge los ses of terri tory. They were 
later pojnted out at Paris as showing the violent and bar-
barous war alms of Germany. 
** The Armistice - signed November 11,1918 at Compei§;ne 
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Chapter II 
The Mechanism of the Conference ,""nd Wilson's Covenant 
Now that the fighting had stopped, the Peace Conference 
was cAlled to meet at Paris for making the peace terms of 
the Armistice definite. All the Allies were to meet and 
make their declarations, grievances, and c19ims. At the 
time of tbe Armistice the people of all the countries were 
for world peace, the 1);ilsonian policy of settling the terms 
of the Peace, and the outlawing of war. After a month or so, 
however, this glitter of the war days wore off. "As the 
call for love and service to mankind grew less intense, 
the voice of self-service and self-love grew strong again. 
Few men have such broad vision that they C8n see earth as 
a whole or can realize all the influence of that which 
happens far in the East upon him who dwells,perchance, in 
the farthest ~est. In the months that followed the Armistice, 
thE' U,ouf'hts of ,,"acn ordinary m&n centered more upon his 
own nation, his own nei€;hborhood, his ONn family, his own 
comfort. "-l~ Ea.ch nation in turn viewed the si tU9tion from 
its own national viewpoint. By the time of the Peace Con-
ference the complete reaction had come. Most of the nations 
brought definite plans for the natiunal security of itself. 
'l'he) all seemed to f2vor tl1e destroying of the defeated or, 
a.t least, th~7economic crippling so that no feET of tbem 
would be possible in the future. 
* CJF.Horne -The Gre'""t Events of the Gre'""t 
War .••. Vol. 7 pg.14 
p 
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The Conference met in JGnuary, 1920. The Supreme 
Council, constituted at the first mefOting, was composed of 
the two ranking deleg~tes of each of the Five Great Powers, 
Great Britain, France, It sly, Japan, and the United States. 
This group, "the Council of Ten," ~s it was often called, 
p.:radually superceded by first "t"he Big Five", and later, 
"the Big Four" composed of 1(,il son, C] emenceau, Lloyd George, 
and Orl ando, carried on the ma.in ':Iork of the conference. 
This was tlie f~lling point of the Conference. Four men 
literally remade Europe. "'The Big Four' who dominated the 
Versailles Peace Treaty, were not economists. They probably 
gave little consideration to the trade balance of the 
various countries. M. C1emenceau, reflecting the views of 
the Frencb people who bad been bled 'ifhi te in every way, 
thought first, last, Bnd al'jJB.ys of the permanent security 
and of the maximum possible indemnity to help repair 
damage-----and to cripple Germany. ,,~:. The French people 
fel t that they had been overwhelmed durj.ng the War of 1870, 
and subsequently paid an indemnity to Germany of one bn 1 ion 
dollars, 'hich for those days seemed a fantastic sum, be-
sides giving up two of their best provlnces, Alsace and 
Lorrej ne. 'l'hen the ,. orld "ar had been brc)urr,t home to every 
French family b~ wa~ of death or of the maiming of one or 
more of its members. It affected them still more because it 
had been fougbt entirely on French soil. Consequently, one 
of tl·c cornerB~onps of ~he Treaty was mapped out by France 
-l:-F.J .Lisman-- lI This Unbalsnced 'j,orld" --Barron' s \~eekly Oct.26 
1931 
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as beinE: fa guarsnty on the pB_rt of .bngl find and the Uni.ted 
States agajnst furtller 9.ttacks on France by Germany. The 
views of Clemenceau ere regarded as tbe most biased of s.ll 
the nstions represented, but it cennot be forgotten that 
they were :illso +:he lrost powerful. Orlando, the Italian 
delegate, was a man that repres(mted his country also, and 
his ideas of " tre~ty were mUC!1 tbe S2me IiIS Clemenceau's. 
Lloyd George, on the other hand, was at tbe be£innirg of tb.e 
Conference inc] ined to follow \]'jilson, who was the only one 
at the Conference that seemed to have any idea as to the 
magnitude Bnd the size of the undertaking. Lloyd George 
:H3S, bowever, forced to ab8ndon this idea as his term of 
office as peace delegate to Paris expired while the Confer-
ence was still going on. In order to be reelected, he was 
forced to adopt a platform of tlHe.ng the Klili s er ll and "rhake 
the Germans pay sliil] tnt for shillirig" • "hen be retll.rned to 
tre Conference, his infI uence could no longf,r be 'lsed to 
furtLcr ~r. iIson's ide~ls. 
Lr. 'ils<Qm insisted that the first point to be taken 
up be that of the Covenant of the League of Nations. he 
had 8 definite plan for this League which he presented to 
the IlBig Four". The;; were forced to discuss it first be-
cause of the dominant posj tion held bJi Mr. val son. The 
United States was the least effected by the ~ar. They were 
about the only country in theforld that had food and money, 
and all the other nations were dependant on these. Mr. 
~I:ilson adopted the principle of ebstina_cy and the other 
17 
nations were forced to agree with him because of this inde-
pendent pos1tion of the Un1ted ~tates. The Covenant of the 
League was thus made an inte~ral part of the general treaty. 
The leading f~atures of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations were: The two leading institutions of the League 
were the l\ssembl J and the Council. The Assembly WIaS the 
general body in which all ststes which are members of the 
League, are represented. in the Assembly, each state was 
equal to every other state and casts a single vote. The 
Council WG.S Iii smaller and fer more important body. As 
sketched in 1919, itv9s to be composed of five permanent 
members, one each from the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Italy, and Japan, together with four members elect-
ed annually by tbe Assembl,P, that is, nine in all. To the 
C01IDCil which meets normally four times a year and .·ifdch 
can be summoned, in addi tion, in nn:.' press1ng emergency, 
import~mt functions were a;::signed. In the first place, it 
must at once act 8S a body of concilators the moment a 
dispute which threatens war arises. As peace is its great 
concern, it is authorized to formulate l-ilrims for the re-
duction of armamnn ts • .it must also atti;mpt to abate tlle 
evils wbJch have arisen from trle private [nd competiU.ve 
manufacture of guns and munitions. A very serious responsi-
bili ty fell upon it in connection wi th the sy stem of mand~tes. 
Under this system, the colonies taken from Germans, liS well 
as many of the pro vinces appropri.ated from Turkey, were not 
considered to be the property of the powers to which they 
werf: assigned, but possessions lield in trust for the League, 
18 
to which an Qnnual report of their &.dministrliltion is due.~~ 
;ith the Coven&nt C8mc the secret sessions of the 
"Big Four". It had been pr0cl&ilimed before the Armistice 
th&t all the methods of "old diplorr.lilc-y" would be done sway 
with.·~·~~ 'fhe "Big· Four 1l h&d 145 sf:~ssions lOS comp&ilred with 
111 held by al J the rest of the groups. 'llbese meetings of 
the Bi£ Four were beJd in secret behind locked doors, with 
no one eJse present. ~h&t w~s the re&ilson for all this 
secrecy and methods of old diplomecy? The intentions of 
these men were good but they failed to c&rr, them out, or 
perL£ps t.hey were not based on the ri~:ht grounds. Tbe reason 
was p&ilrtly the tress. The opinion of the Big Four on tbis 
is expres sed by th e v:ords of Lloyd George. He sa.id, 11 If 
th~ Press int 0 rvenes in the early stages of the negotations, 
it will crystallize opinions :and agreement will be rr&ilde 
more diffi cult. \I A un~nimi ty of votes 'Nas necess2r:y and 
this '!f~.S t.hought to be impossible if the Press Wfil.S allowed 
an open hand. Politics 1i'.'ould be brought into pl&ilY r-long 
with the Press. A very tr&ilGic incident of the Press h&.d 
&lread, caused a difference of opinion :in France, and this 
exper:tence along with t}le a.bove nsrned re&son caused the 
Press to be wittilield. 
In msking the Pe&ilce, it was deemed a matter of first 
importance to make impossible a reviv&ill of the Teuton 
agfressive spirit aga 4 nst France, because the territorial 
cessions and the repsrations dem&nds of France would 
-I:. ScheiTill 
The History of Europe--- pg. 744 
~<* Wilson l sl1Fourteen .toints" 
Point One -- 1I 0pen covenants of peace openly ,a.rri v~d 
at ....• " 
p 
19 
naturalJy cause the German peoplf: to seel~ future opportunity 
to be revenged. '"ith a population almost, if not quite, 
doub] e that of the Prench Republic, Gerr.umy would be a con-
stsnt menQce to the nation which had suffFlred so terribly 
in the past by reason of the imperislistic spirit prevalent 
:in the German Empire. The fear of this menace strongly in-
fluenc~d the French policies dur:ing the neEotQtions at Paris. 
In fact, it was hard to 8void the feeling that this fear 
dominated the conduct of the French delegates and the atti-
tude of tbe!r Government. They demanded much, and, recogniz-
ing the prob9"ble effect of their demands on tbe German 
people, SOUgl1t to obt~in special protection in case their 
vanquished enemy attempted in the future to dispossess them 
b-y force of UP, ] lind which they had been compelled to sur-
render or attempt to make them restore the indemnity paid. 
The aggenda of the Treaty ryas; The Covenant, the 
boundaries of German-y, Ger!T1sn-y outside of Furope, arm~nents 
2nd reparations, finEncial Bnd econo~ic c1Buses and other 
miscellaneous clauses. 
In this first IHilrt, the League Covenant"; the League of 
Nations was pl~nned out in its every det~il, as tas been 
before mentioned. It '."as "'lr. 'tiJ son's idea U18+; it be tnade 
an = nte t T2l part of U e 'l'rr ~"t;y ~nd Ccn:'8nJi .has on1 y ldm to 
thBnk bec9use he held out against the entire Conference for 
its prjnciples and even on one occasion threatened to leRve 
the Conference on this account. The European people, how-
ever, misunderstood the Covenant in that they took it to 
* The Tre~ty of Vers~illes-Part I - Section II 
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mean that "America had entered the V,:ar, and tbat Mr. Wilson 
had come to Paris as final proof that the people of the 
United States would unhesita.tine;ly consent to bear all the 
burdens, run ~ll the risks, accept all the difficulties, 
i nc1dent to perpetual intermixtures in l1:uropean affairs. 
"At the moment when the Treaty of Versailles was being 
made, all the European Allied peoples were demanding 
passionately, 1ncessBntly, unreservedJy, the r~alization of 
all their material claims. Yet all took it as a foregone 
conclusion tlu.t the peop1 e of the United States, who had 
resigned all title Bnd interest in the fruits of the common 
victory, would be s (ltisfied to accept a contract, by wl',ich 
Europe subscribed, with reservations, to the vaguest sort 
of moral princiy1cs, while the United ~tates undertook the 
most specific ~nd far-reachirg material responsibilities."* 
It ~as on this account that tte peoples of ~urope made 
such a strenuous obj Bction to the 'rreaty after the Ameri.can 
Congress refused to ratify it, because the Allied statesmen 
constructed their sett1empnt with Germany on the grounds 
tbat such would be the interpretation of the future relation 
of the United States with Europe. 
!lIn 19J 9, the :-natf'rial int0rests of the Europe8n visitors 
and the moral enthusiasm of the American President, comb:!ned 
to tlHilke the bBsic priIlcip1e of the l'eBce ~"ett1ement. "~H:-
This moral enthusiasm of tt:e President was expressed when 
he said tLat the general plsn of tbe League was;(l) That it 
.r,. Frank H. ~,immonds "How .burope Made f 8ace \;lthout America"p. 28 




should be strong enough to prevent Q future RttQck upon 
nations; (2) To make the world s:.fe for democracy; (3) To 
remove in a me~.sure the immediate causes of war; (4) To 
provide peaceable meRns of settle~ent of disputes; (5) To 
promote Ii closer friends~ip of nations; (6) To ~ave an inter-
nRt~onal union ags 1nst war; &nd last, to organize the world. 
Whether or not all thAse principles hRve been cgrricd out 
i.n t.be JenEue Covenant is left to the individual opinion, but 
I beJieve that it can be truthfully said that the President 
did rll in his povrer t.o embody the above in tt.e Covenant. 
The figl'it that the .President had to put up for the Covenant 
was :,olrr!ost superruman, but it was included in Ule fiLQl 
Treaty. 
To have some idea of the repelling forces, let us look 
at the policy of t;Le French. "The important fact is that 
the settlements in favor of France under the Treaty were of 
a nRture which made the cc:ntinuance of peace between t~te 
two natjons doubtfnl if Germany possessed the abiJ i ty to 
re£8jn her m1]it~ry strength and if nothing was done to pre-
vF:nt l1er from usj ne!' it. Under these circumst ~lDces, a 
special protective treaty seemed fl prf<ctic['] way to check 
the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the Germans into 
another war of InvGsion."* 
There were also two other clauses of the Covenant 
that the French opposed. '1'he first is quoted; "The members 
of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace re-
quires the reduction of nstional fJrmaments to the lowest 
o):·Robert I ans1ng "The Pea.ce Nef'otations ll pg. 185 
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point consistent 'fiith the nation .. ] safety ~md the enforce-
ment by common action of international obligations. 
liTtle Council, taking account of the geograpYdcsl sit-
untion and circumstsnce of each [;,tate, shall formulste 
plans for such reduction for the consideration and action 
of trle several Governments. ".::-
The otter clause opposed by the French was that. which 
proposed that the colonial possessions of the Central Powers 
be viven over as Mandstes to the supervision of the League. 
It read; liThe best. method of giving practicaJ effect to 
this pr1nciple is th&t the tutelage of such people sbould 
be entrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their 
resources, their experience, or their geoe:rsphical posi tion 
can best undertake this responsi bili ty, and vt:ho are \l/il1 ing 
to accept it, and that this tutelage shou],d be exercised 
by them as M andl'!tories on behalf of the League. IIJ':_-;;_ 
* The Treaty of Versailles 
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Chapter III 
The Boundpries of Germany 
The second part of the Treaty, however, seemed to 
quiet the French oppositiGn mentioned above as the boundaries 
of the New Germ~ny were made. As c~n be readily seen on the 
accomp~ingmap, Germany lost much to France. First, let us 
look at the SaHr Basin. This w~s a small tract of land 
(738 square m' les) betvleen the bound2ries of Germany and 
France. It belonged to Germany, but the French asked for 
outright annexation of it at the Conference because of the 
German destruction of French mines during the War at Lens, 
Valenciennes, and other places. This Basin is ver;y importm t 
because of its coal fields. Before the war it produced 18 
million tons of coal Rnnu9Jly. This section was almost com-
plete] y German in population. 'rhe conference refused France 
the right of annexation but a compromise was made, the terms 
being:--The Saar Blilsjn was to be detacheo. from G"rm~ny and 
a separate state was to be created, with the League as a 
guj ding hand. The government was to consi st of five men, one 
from France, one local, and three neither French nor German. 
These were to be appointed by the League yearly. The owner-
to 
stip of the m4nes was to go the French. In 15 years after 
1920, a plebiscite was to be heJd in this area and this would 
determj.ne the government--whether .B'rench, German, or a 
continuation of the autonomous rule of the League. But 
if tte paebisci te went back in f'tvor of tbe Germans, the 
Germans would be forced to buy the mines outright from the 
Frencll with gold. 
Next clil.me the decj_sion a;lAl sace-Lorraine. Thi s is a1so 





indicQted on tbe mGp. rrovision for the return of this 
territory wr;;s written in tbe j!,rmistice. ~t re~d: "The 
territories which iere ceded to Germany in accordance with 
the preliminaries of ~eace signed at Vers~illes on February 
26,1871, and tbe Treaty of Frankfort of lVla)' 10,1871, are 
restored to French sovereignty 8S from the dEte of the 
I~rmistice of l~ovember 11, 1918."~- Als~-ce-Lorraine is very 
import~nt 2S an industrial ~nd a mining center. It is &bout 
the size of Connecticut and Vermont (5,695 square miles). 
Its population at the present is ~bout 1,795,000. It is 
importlOmt for tbree reasons: (1) At fechelbraun is the only 
important oil well in Germany; (2) Its rich potash mines; 
and (3) The Lorr~ine iren fields. In 1913, these fields 
produced 21,000,000 tons of iron. "In spite of 911 th:;.t 
has been written about the supposed affinities and desires 
of the population of j,lsace-Lorraine, it must not be for-
gotten U:~t tte n"tionfill interests of Germl<ny ~nd France sre 
vit~lly concerned in its possession, not merely in the 
general sense of +;he deslrf: to keep or to recover something 
which has been fou~ht over as " matter of national honor, 
but in the very definite respects of m"ll i tary advl'<nt~,ge 
lOnd economic power. And t}lere }r',ave been times when tYese 
con~iderations were put nakedly in the foregrcund as the 
dominant moti ves. "~H~ The sovereignty of this territory 
has been the subj ect of controversy for mlOny dec~.des in 
Europe. The most propounded argument is th&t it whould be 
i:- 'l'he P.rmi stice at Compeigne j\rticle 51 




governed by thRt country which has the l~rgest percentage 
of its nfitive citizens in the province. This ethn.lof:'ical 
argument 'Nas broken down by t1',e f~.ct tliet the countries, 
Austria Rnd Switzer]snd both had the l~rger percentage of 
German-speaking: people, yet they remHined independent. The 
argument whicl).'lon out in the Conference was tllat of nation-
91 sBf.::>ty. "International bound~ries m&.y be drawn along 
ethnic, economic, geographic, bistoric, or str8tegic lines. 
6ne or all of these elements m8Y influence the deCiSion, 
but'!hetever argument may be urged in favor of anyone of 
these, th"~ chief obj ect in the determinfltion of the 
sovereignty to be exercised ~jthin Q certain territory is 
of Q nstion as self-pres0rvption is jn the life of an 1ndi-
vidu:z.l. It j s even more so, 8 s nat ions do not respoy,d to 
the impulse of se] f-sRcrifice."~~ 1ience, the fact tlH,t 
Alsflce-Iorrgine WGS aJmos L dghty-five percent GerroBn-
speaking in 19JO did not effect the terms of the TrQsty. 
The next step t&ken in the Treaty WBS the fixing of· 
tle relr:tions of Germ~my 'r;j th Austri 2. 'rhe 'rreaty read, 
"Germany acknowl (;df:es I;;nd \: ill Y'espect strictly the j.nde-
pendence of rustris, with5n the frontiers which may be 
fixed in a Trpsty between that ;~,tate Bcd "-:h(3 Principal 
Allied and Associated iowers; she agrees that this inde-
ppndence shEll be inalienable, except with the consent of 
the Counell of t:be Le8cue of l~ations .II~H:- Like terms were 
included for i;he nCfJ Czecho-tSJaiwon:i,a,tate, fol~nd, RussiR, 
~:- Lansing-- The ,pepce Ne~QtiltiQns-- Pg. 102 




and tl1e new RussiiO.n Stat0s. By these terms F'rtilnce Wfi,S 
building up her policy of security. By these, she put 
Germany in such " posjtion tb2t no secret ullisnces or 
agreements of any kind couJd be made or in any ~ay could 
e unj on be made by ":hi ch Germany could join with any other 
power against Prance. 
FolJow1ng the sbove, we find the decision BS to the 
boundary between Germ:;nJ7 ~md the new foland. 'rhe most im-
port ant concession of the eastern bound~ry of Germ&ny was 
that of Upper '::11esia. This territory ',las extraordinariJy 
ricl1 in minersls and import ant industri ~llly. For example, 
just before thelilr, its COGI production ,,y,"s 44,000,000 
tons yearly-- three times ss great as that of the Saar 
Basin and 23% of Germlilnyls total output of coal. It furnish-
ed 34% of her production of l~&d ore; and 81% of her zinc. 
"'l'he loss of so immensely viO.luabl e F terri tory would mean 
8 severe bJow to the economic life as well as to the pride 
of the '~~erm ~n peopl e. It (![J.B a s Bcrif ice thFt cou] d be 
f2ir] y dem~lllded only if tIle lrE'jori ty of th-=-' popu] ::otion in 
Upper ~ilesia. desired unj on ,'it th !~oland. As to the wishes 
of the population, tLe evidence was strongly in f:;ovor of 
Polish claims, but it was not absolutely conclusive. lience, 
the Conference finally resolved th&t in so gr&ve a matter 
the decision must be left in t}-f) hands of the people 
tnemsel ves by plebiscite. II~~ There were ,"Iso three other 
provinces left to B plebiscite in this iO.rea; Terchen, ArvQ, 
and Bzepes (Zips). This decision of the e&stern boundary 
re1ates to the topic for two reasons: first, because Fr~mce 
* Haskins End Lord -- ~Qme Problems of the Peace Conference 
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lit~rally wes responsible for the decision and second, be-
cause it 'flaS one of the found~·tions of the }'rench pol icy. 
The French were interested in this territory bec~use they 
wished to see it joined to the hew 1"0] and. Anot~er point 
'!!88 thr;t the sepBratlon of tbis imporbmt inining section 
v!ould furt.t~pr cripvle the Germa.ns and sloV'! dO'Nn their 
possibi1itles of ever usjng it again to the height of the 
Great rowers. 
Now ca~e the making of the new Poland. This esteblish-
mf'llt of Polgnd, or rather the reestabJ ishment, was the one 
polnt in the Treaty that vIas lID bonest application of the 
princ ipl es of the Fourteen l'olnts as ] aid d011\Tn by i1 son 
and on which the Treaty was supposed to have been built. 
On the principle of tl'e reestabl isbment, all the Fowers 
agreed, but tbis '!'las only the beginning. ',''chat were the 
boundaries to be'? Poland had been era_sed from the map so 
long that it remained only l.< name, a memory, or a cause 
rather than a country. The bound~lries fjnalJ_y laid down 
incJuded most of .east rrussia, ";,est IJrussia, and the pro-
vince of Posen. At this deciSion, Germ:my could hardly 
make anJ1 legitimate protest, but she did on the point that 
France was only doinE this to place a 'buffer' state be-
tween her and Russia, in order to prevent any coalition. 
A further development of this will be se':::n in the post-
W8_r years. 
To get a view of the Polish opinion let us look at 
the opening words of Ignace Paderewski's speech to the 
Polish people. liThe .L-olish nation is to-day] i vjng through 
F 
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solemn moments. I suppose that in its eventful history there 
INsa never 9. t:tme more solemn, more flOteful thQn the present. 
The fQte of our country is at stake; powerful people hold-
ing in their hands the destiny of the world, &ire building 
a fr~mework for our independent existence, we decid~ng 
the frontiers of our State, and soon wil] pronounce a final 
sentence, from wbich, no doubt for long years, there will 
be no appe~l, perlJ9ps for many generations. Violent bursts 
of hope and of joy snd anxiety are strongly shaking our 
nation::;] spirit. From ever) side, f rom every corner of our 
former commonweal th, people are coming here to ~;',9rsaw 2nd 
going there to raris, in frock coats Bnd smock frocks, 
in old-fsshioned country dress, in mount~ineer costume, 
and t', ey cr,'y aloud End implore tha t their dj.stant province 
should be united to the 101 ish State. "-1~ 
Further tlHm tIlis the Polish na+,ion had been promised 
a port on the Sea. The realization of this w~s far more 
tedious than i t ,~ra s expected. Danzig, was the 10gicBl port 
to offer f'oland but this city at the mouth of tbe Vistula 
hed b,~en buil t up by Germany and it was in truth ~ German 
city. To give it over to the ioles was an open breach of 
the Fourteen foints 8nd in entire oPPosition to the prin-
ciples of the whole Conference. Another solution tothe 
problem was sought. It was establishment of the Free City 
of Danzig. By this, since the Conference could not give 
Pol:ond liil.ccess to the selii on ethnigraphic grounds, it was 
stated thet, "The Allied and Associated Powers undertake 
to establish tbe town of Danzig, together with the rest of 
~l- Ignace Paderewski---nddress made in !,~rsaw in May, 1919 
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the territory described in Article 100 (the narrow strip 
of territory surrounding the city a total population 
of about 30~000), as a Free Citi. It will be placed under 
the protection of the League of NBtions. 1I~\- At the same 
tjme, tbe Allied ~md Aflsociated Powers undertook to estab-
] ish a Treaty between the Fo1ish Government and the Free 
Ci ty of Danzig which had the fo110vdng obj ects; (1) '1'0 
include the Free City of Danzig in the customs frontiers 
of the 1"01 ish Government; (2) To ensure 1-01 and of the 
free use of the Danzig port lil.nd waterways; (3) To give 
Poland control of the railw~ys in the City, Gnd 21so con-
trol of the means of cornmunic~tion; (4) The right to im-
prove the above works; (5) To provide 0 gainst the des-
crimination of fo1ish citizens in the Free City; (6) To 
manage the foreign relations of Danzig as well as the 
diplomatic protection of the citizens abroad. To sum R]l 
the above into the one phrase, Danzig was separated from 
roland only technic91ly, but united v7ith her geographi-
cally and economically. 
This discussion of F'oland CBnr:.ot be complete V'Jithout 
the mention of the Corridor. frhis is the s trip of land that-
connects Poland mGjor with the Baltic Sea. This Corridor 
separates Germany from ElOst i'russia. East Prussia is a 
pure German province, 15,000 square miles in area with a 
popul&tion of 2~ million. It is a marvellously tilled 
territory which stands out jn contrast to the undeveloped 
* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part 3 -- Article 102 
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territories of its neighbors. The ~oles wished to obt~in 
p:.rt of th'is territory j.n order that they have complete 
control of the shortest railwQy route from ~arS8W to Danzig. 
They obt~ined the right to :. plebiscite in the desired :.re:. 
but their hopes were dashed b-y the large majority of Germsn 
votes wh:ich reverted the territory to the Germans. The 
Corridor, however, rem:.incd. ~he sovereignty of this terri-
tory was derived on ethnographic grounds. It had iii. majority 
neither Germ:.n nor folish, but was constituted mainly of 
Laschubs, who are [~,l:.vic, :.nd other isolated groups of 
alien peoples. ~ince the est~blishment of the rolish sover-
eignty in the Corridor, the majority of Gprmans have left 
and now it is predominantly Polish. fhe IDB1n objection of 
Germany to this is the f:.ct that the Corridor separates 
them from Fast ~russia. These decisions concern'ing Polend 
were careful J -y pl anned b-y the French. 'rhey s:.w in the j\j ow 
Poland an ~IJ y aglainst Germany. By buD ding up i)oland and 
making her 2S strong as pOSSible, it insured the security 
of France. By g~dning for Pol:.nd these vRluable concessions, 
Poland WIilS put under obligation to France. 1'11 these con-
cessions only increased the h:.tred of Germany for F'r:.nce 
:.nd built up more and more the desire for revenge. * 
The bound:.ry between Germlil.ny Iilnd DenD1:.rk WIilS to be 
determined lil.ccord"ng to the wishes of the population. By 
thjs Germany lost little territory. As this does not con-
cern the Frlilnco-Germliln action it will be passed over with 
only the mentioning of it. 
The next p&rt of the Treaty was the decision of 
J,~ R.V,.V. TemperlY,editor - A Eistar}, of the ,['eljiCe Conference 
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Heliogo1~nd. This was ~ sm~11 island in the North Sea ~t 
the mouth of the ~lbe River that hed been used during the 
"~r as a very import~nt fortificliOtion. The fortifications, 
mil i tary es tBb] i shmen ts, ~ nd 1 :ilrbors were to be d'3stroyed 
by !}ermany and;rere not to be reconstructed in the future. 
This destroyed rmy hope of Germany to ever end:mger 'J'iestern 
Europe bJ' water. 
to 
LliOst came the decision as/Belgium. '.th1s is outstanding 
because Belgium had been a neutral at the beginnIng of the 
.,:ar and GermanJ' had forced her into tile '.,Jar. rrhe Belgiams 
had fou£:bt side b:; side with the lllied ?owers. They had 
suffered more than ~-my other nation because of the German 
occ'Lpation lasting almost during the entire Vhi •. r. \,nen the 
1Nliir 'Nas ended, Belgium expected much in compensation. \';hen 
the council of the 'lIen 'Nas called, Belgium was excluded, 
likewise in the Council of Four. '11his WfJ.S not thei.r only 
disappointment however, beclimse the:; expected a correctlon 
in the boundary on the frontiers of holland and luxemburg, 
two neutr91 countries vil,icb were not mc:mbcrs of the t'eace 
Conference and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction 
of it. The only boundar~ correction that naS mAde was a 
very small addition to Be1gium on the German frontier. 
According to the 'rrelilty, the Kreise, tiiR1medy, and .c,upen 
were transferred to Belgium (376 square miles; 61,000 popu-
lation) • 01:' 
One matter affecting holland did, however, concern the 
Conference, namely tbe neutr~lity of Belgium, which had 
been compu1sor;y and guar:.nteed by three treaties -- one 
* Ibid. Chapter III Pa.rt IV 
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between the Five Great powers and Belgium, one between 
these powers 8nd hOlT and, smd one between holland and Bel-
gium (1839). Belgium thus obt~dned ~. hearing at tre Confer-
ence with the object "to free Belgium from that JimitRtion 
on her sovereignty which w ~.s imposed on her by the treaties 
of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium end of gener-
al peace, to remove the dangers of BelE:ium 8nd the disadvm-
tages arising from tt~e s=-id treaties." Belgium and Holland 
were accordingl) invited to appe~r before the l"onference in 
order to set forth their views wjth regard to auch a revision. 
The Belgiums mBintuined that she had been 2.';i ven vlcak frontiers 
in 1839 on the r:round that she was to be protected b:y the 
Great Powers; such protection having failed disastrously 
in 1914, she should be given frontiers which would enable 
her to hold her own ~ith her neighbors, in ~ar snd in 
pea.ce. Belgium arFued that the unlimited sovereignty 'uhich 
had been promised her in rresident '.'il son t s seventh point 
ought to c larry wi tb it the frontiers tll~t had been denied 
her in the days of her weakness. holland had no objection 
to the abandonment of Belgium t s neutr~"J it), which had been 
guaranteed to her as well as to Belgium, ~ut she would not 
consider for F moment any concession of her own territory. 
She declared, however, thlilt she WliilS re8dy to discuss amicably 
wi tll Bel gium any adjustments of conditions of navig9t ion, 
etc. A Commission was appointed and it set to work immedi:3.teJ y, 
but when the Conference was ready to liil.dj ourn it had no re-
port ~s yet to make so Hol'End was successful in every way. 
"If the tnrritorial stgtus of Belgium h.s not been essen-
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'ilOrE:E. No sllare in a prob} emRtic indemnity 'sill compensate 
hRr for ber direct losses, not to spe:;;k of ber other ex-
penses -- the stripping of her resources, the enforced 
idleness of her factories, the disappe~r~nce of her foreign 
markets and ber t.rf)llsit trlilde."-l<- A hero in 1914, is Bel-
gium to rem~d n a crippl e for the future? 'l'he German is gone, 
but he left; ru1n and disil 'usion bebind []jm. Belglum now 
looks 8t t'[,e prosperous Boll~nd, th9t remaired neutral, nnd 
the Luxr:m"burg that succumbed, land wonders that in the future 
wleich course she 'l,'ill follow. rrhere is 11 ttle doubt. For 
t.he future, Belgium's security lies :i.n a strong League of 
Nl!ftions ~d jnlhat such & Le&EUe st8nds for. r.t first, 
Belgium teak thp LeaGue as p. "mere scrap of t'apf:rll, but 
now she reaJizes that cooperation with the League 1s the 
best, since it ~as the sense of internationel right that 
brollght the world to Belf:ium'S side in the Great \',ar, and 
it is in the broadening and deepening of th~t sense that 
the chief hope lies in the future. j:.~lso Belgium found a 
friend in Prance. Fr~nce desired &1lie8 ~nd by the building 
up of Be] gi um she ',~ouJ d have ~mother country under obI iga-
tion to her. Bel giumNas Q very desir9bJ e f~ll y bec8use of 
her intense hatred for GETmany. Another f~ct to be r0member-
ed is that Belgium separates FranCE: from Germany, thus 
rnB_king Belgium too a 'buffer state'. 
* H~skins &nd lord -- fome ~roblems of the P8ace Conference 
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Germ~n Ri€~hts ~nd Interests Outside of Germany 
This section of the treaty was not so much ~dvoc~ted 
b J Frfmce ~ 8 i t W~ s by ;:,ng} f:nd. By the treaty, however, 
GermanYfI,"s forced to renounce ~l her rights, titles, snd 
pr1vileges, :vhatever their origin, in the territory outside 
her Furope~m frontiers. This me"nt thQt Germrmy no longer 
had any title to her overseSiS possessions. This point is 
rdavamlt to our subj ect onls in the fact that this concession 
belped Fr~nce in her policy of security. It completed the 
isolation of Germ2ny from the rest of the 'i'lorld. Of all 
the former Germ~n colonies, Prance received only a portion 
of equatori:al f.frica and the Mandfitte of all section of 
Togol"nd. 'Ehe rest of the Germ:;n colonies were distributed 
as follows:* 
German E:Iil.st Africa; Tant::anyika terri tory -British !V:andate 





German ~outhwest Africa; Mandate of Unjon of S.A. 
KQ.merun; French C&meroon -Frencb M:mdate 
French equatorial Africa -restored to Fr. 
British Cameroon -British Mandate 




''Nestern ~',amoa; New Zeal~nd Mandate 
Nauru; British Mandate 
Former Kaiser r,ilhelm Land; Austr~ '118n M:mdate 
, 







The lease of ~hantung, negotiated from China in 1898, was 
renounced in favor of Japan. This was especially to apply 
to the Kiao-chow peninsula. 
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Chapter V 
The DisarnllmJent of Germ.ny 
By the terms of the Armistice, Germfllny agreed tod1ss01ve 
her army ~nd to surrender to the AJ lie s prfll.ctic.] ly tbe 
whole of her mi 1 i tlitr:; "nd n.vlitl equipment. 'l'llis included 
ber bro.ttle fleet, her submarines, her hesv:; l'Irtillery, her 
macbine guns, her munjtions, "nd ber ~irplaDes. A grelitt 
power was r~tAd as such in Europe~n afflilirs by the litpproxi-
m"te proportion of its army ~nd nlilvy to the size of tbe 
country. Although tbis WlitS not wbat h:istorians ususlly 
wrote in tr'eir books, it WIiOS 'Jb~t every diplomGt knew. The 
purpose bebind the disarmament megsures of ty,e Paris diplo-
mats is therefore clear: it w~s to reduce Germ.ny from tbe 
status of a great power. However, it was stated in the Treaty 
tbus; "In order to render possible the initiation of a gen-
erlill limitQtion of tbe armb>ments of litl] n~tions, Germany 
undertEkes strictlJi to observe tbe military, navlitl, and 
litir clauses which follow."* This cJliluse in the treaty 
that forces disarmament on Germany seems to be the one so 
long sought by Fr~nce. By it, Germany U2S limited to a 
standir~g iiirmy of 100,000. 'l'hese 'i'iere to be devoted exclusi ve-
ly to the ma:intenance of order within tbe territory 9nd to 
the control of the frontier. 
Universal compulsory milit~r~ service was to be 
Fbolished in Germ~ny, ~nd the grmy WFS to be constituted 
vVbolJ y of volunteers, serving for Iii period of twel ve yelilrs. 
* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part V -- line 1-3 
37 
All the fortific&i-tions, fortresses, :md field works si tu~t­
ed in Germ~ny to the west of a line drawn 30 miles to the 
ea_st of the Rhine were to be disliOrmed ~nd dismantled and 
to rem8in so, and the cens tructi,-,n of any new fortlfica-
tion was strictly forbidden. 
The naval clauses 0~re just as severe in that they 
limited the navy to 6 battleships (small type), 6 light 
cruisers ~nd 12 each of the destroyer and torpedo types. 
This c~n be compared with th~t of Pr~nce which was then 10 
battlesr-ips, 14 cruisers, lmd 147 of tr,e other types, 
tog:;ther 'tli th 42 submarines, which were strictly forbidden 
the Germlilns. A]so tbe navy force was limited to 15,000 
men, including officers. 
In respect to tbe pir forces tbe Treaty read, "The 
armed forces of Germlilny must not include IiIny military or 
naval li1 ir forces. "~l- Thus GermGny was reduced to Iit_ minor 
power, never to Y'ise aglilin. Her ~ rmy was deprived of the 
charliictf;ristic equipment of the m:iichine-~ge liind obliged to 
renounce the use of heavy artillery, tanks, poison glilS, and 
~irplanes; her navy was forbidden to build, buy, or own 
submarines, her wlilr-harbor of Heligoland was destroyed, her 
fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine COi.lld not be 
ma:ntllined. In short, she was to be open to inv~sion from 
every side and she!lould be unable to defend herself y{ben 
invaded. She was put in such a position tlHi,t she 'Nould 
never be able to invade Imother country b-;; land, &ir or water. 
Tbis ~as the realization of the long sought desire of France. 
* The Treaty of Versailles -Part 5, Section 3, Article 198 
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She felt th~t the disarmament of Germany would render 
security both for herself and for tbe newly erected bound-
aries of Europe. 
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Chapter VI 
The Financial and Reparations Clauses 
The first clause of the reparations section of the 
Treaty fixed the ~ar guilt. lt read, "The Allied and 
Associated Governments affirm Io1nd Germ~my accepts the 
responsibility of Germany and her ~IJies for c8using all 
the loss and dlilmage to which the Allied and Associated 
Governments ~;nd their nationals have been subjected as a 
consequence of the war imposed upon them by tbe aggression 
of Germany and her allies. II~. 
This did not relate merely or primarily to the legal 
l,abili ty for damgge which had been accepted by Germany in 
the Armistice, but it was designed to establish the fact 
that the 'Nar had been caused by Germany, and itw:;os re-
quired of German representliiti ves to sign this docmnent as 
a confession of crime. It was the disclosure of the purpose 
of the Allied peoples to deu1 with the Germans as a guilty 
people. T~is guilt clause was the climax of the Treaty. Up 
to this time, feeling had been held in to a certlain extent. 
It had appeared first in the French spirit of revenge, then 
by the British in their desire for the German colonies, 
but each time '.'ii1son was a.b1e in a measure to supress these. 
This flna1 clause expressediiith utter unanimity by the 
Allied peoples ruined the -J'!ho1e purpose of' the 'I'reaty, in 
that it destroyed the fundamental prjncip1es on which the 
Treaty WIiOS supposed to have been based. "The Germans must 
* The Treaty of Versailles -Part 8, Section 1, Article 231 
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be ruil ty because :;11'_ f\llied peoples unanimously bel ieved 
and knew tbem to be fuilty. In no democracy was there oppo-
sition; in ~ll, the verdict was un~n1mous. The very failure 
of the Germ:m people to ,"cknowledge the truth thus estab-
lisbed, became a new proof of the t;lccur"c), of the indictment. TI 
~ith the above as a basis, the Rep~rations clauses 
were put down. The Allies recognized the inabj.lity of Ger-
mrny to pay for the entire war, so they specified deftnite 
items for which compens~tion was to be made. These were; 
first, all damRfe done to civiliwns of the Allied ~nd 
Associ~ted towers and their property; second, the restora-
tion of Belgium; and last, the restoration of that pGrt of 
France which the Germa.ns had destroyed. The amount of tbis 
repEration was to be det~rmined by a Reparation Commission 
sppointed at tbe Conference. In these clauses the Conference 
was not writing a mere contract of dollars and cents, but 
it was deaJ ing with blood-rRV'i passions still pulsing through 
the people's veins. It was imj~ossible to ignore the huml>ln 
factors, but provisions were made vihereby they could be 
reduced or eJimiD!>ted later, and 1fihereby, the Reparation 
Commission, in the procf';ss€S of enforcement, might become 
a flexible instrument of ::isdom and justice. "No one CRn 
understand the peace treat)' who does not know end csnnot 
measure the humrn condi tions under which it wa s brought 
forth. It is singular but true that peGce seemed very beau-
tiful durjng the war, but almost ha.teful when the war ended. 
From R sllperficial survey of the conditions that prevsiled 
pt the Pe~ce Conference one would ~~ve been quite justified 
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in assuming t.hat IT an;y of the participants preferred war 
with all the borrors to any peace short of ttia.t wh ich tbey 
demrmded. 'rheir demands hRd their genesis in deep-rooted 
~.nd a1 most ineradiCBb1e hatreds lolnd in tbe lnsistent desire 
for self.-prot ec tion liga inst future danger. "?~ Although the 
ftllied Powers r,ad IiIgreed to a l'elilce upon the blisis of 1"res-
ident 1'ilson' s Fourteen Points, ~ tbe principlf's of 
settlement were to be formulated not in the j nterest of Ger-
mlilny, but to promote tbe !'ea.l interest of the Allies them-
sel ires and to adv~nce the cause of world peace lilnd future 
security, public opinion ch~ged so mucb tllat tbe dele8~tes 
were forced to ch&.nge also. Examples of this change are 
shown in Frsnce by the dlilcards proclaiming "que 1't.llemlilgne 
pliye d'Bbord" (Let Germ:.o.ny pay first) which covered the 
walls of Paris during the days of the Conference, by the 
refusal of the French to adopt any immediate t:;;x~tion mea-
sures, insistjng thlit Germ&,ny should IiIssume the burdens 
of the war, and in I<ngl and by the reel ection of Lloyd George 
on the basis of an increase in the severity of the tsrms ~ 
peace, f speci~lly tbose of repar~tion. Publie opinion had 
been aroused to B. wh i te heat of fe~r, hatred, :;ond distrust. 
Facing these facts, one can EBSily r891ize the impossibility 
of arri vine: at Ii treaty free from passion Iilnd a sense of 
wrong.· V!itb this in mind, the demand for the immedlate 
payment of $,50,000,000 .s the flrst instal]ment of Repara-
tions, together with almost 400,000 head of ]jve stock and 
immense quantities of coaland dyestuffs, cIOn be partly 
* Baruch -- The Making of the Rep~rQtions ~nd Economic Sections 
Qf tl1e Peace Treaty pg. 5 & 7 
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justified. The rem~inder of the Rep~rlOltions ~nd the report 
of the Commission will be 8i yen l~ter. rl'he h~ndlng over of 
the live stock, cOlil.l, md other supplies by GermloO.ny to the 
dev~st~ted are~s of Frfmce IOInd Bel gium Wio.S justified in the 
minds of the French ~s only legjtimate. The Germ~ns compare 
d 
Fr~nce dem~nding these to Shylock dem~ning his pound of 
flesh to w}lich his bond entitles him. They depict Frlil.nce as 
f~natic, blinded by hatred, possessed with the mlil.nia of 




The H~ll of Niirrcrs at Versailles, June 28,1919 
On M~y the 7th, 1919, the Treaty was ready for present~-
tion to tr,e German deleglittion. Tbey were told peremptorily 
that no round t&.ble discussion VI;as to be allo'.lcd. 'l'bey 
mig:ht, however, communicate in wri ting their obj ections to 
the tc'ms submitted. 'l'ttis theJ did. Count Von Brocl-:dorff-
RsntzRu, the head of the Germ~n d~legaticn, mgde 2 very 
lenftl~y protest ""hj cb st&'tl';d ttle G~rmliin vievls. He pointed 
out tbe f~.ct tb9t tbe trc~t) 'xas supposed to hlilve been 
based on justice and ttat Germ&n~, cut to pieces and wesk-
ened, could b ardJ y meet the dem~nds of her enemies on repw Iil-
tions. "No lirdt is fixed, save the c&p~city of the German 
people for pasment, determlned not by tbei r st~md"rd of 
life, but solel~ b~ their capacit~ to meet the demands of 
tbeir enemies by their labor. The German people would thus 
be condemned to perpetual s19ve labor.". 
M. Clemenceau made lii reply to tbe numerous protests 
of the Germans that stated: the internvtionsl rights which 
she cl:idmed"{pre onlJ temporarlly c:l1tbheld; that it :i:;OS not 
proposed to exclude her from the League permanently, nor 
to erect econemic bliilrriers liieud nst her; that there must be 
a tr~nsition period durjng whjcb the economic balance was 
to be restored; and that Germany w~s to redeem her reputa-
tion. He majntained that it was ~ peace, not of violence, 
but of justice; that it was not based on condonation of the 
* Count Von Brockdorff-Rantzau -- Letter to M. Clemenceau 
as President of the Paris Peace Conference. From "Great 
Eyents of the Great TIar" Vol 7 -- see bibliography. 
» 
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events of 1914-18; that reparation for wrongs inflicted was 
of tne essence of Justice: that GermanJ was responsjble for 
the '.'Jar bec&luse for m=-.ny years her ruJ ers had striven for 
a "position of dorr:iLance :in Europe" and attempted to "dictate 
lind tyrannise to a subservient Europe"; that they sought to 
"sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between 
nations; that they had developed a. system of espionage and 
intrigue wh1 ch enabled them to stir up intf:rna~ rebellion 
Bnd unrest, and even to make secret offensive preparations 
wi tbin the terri tori es of thej.r neighbors, whereby they 
might strike them down with greater security lilnd ease"; 
that tte German Revolution could not be counted liil.S absol ving 
tte Germ~m people f ror:l these crimes against Hum£mi ty and 
Ripht, for the Revolution bRd been 8t,&'-yed until the German 
armies h9d vanished by a WQr of conquest; and fjnally that 
it was impossible toexpect the free nations of the world 
"to sit dovm immedjateJy in equal association with those by 
wbom theJ have been so fi'rievously 'i'!ronged". This :;.J.rticle 
consisted of some 20,000 words and expressed perfectly 
the AlJ ied atti tude. Finally, li'. fter much din y-dall ying 
;. 
on the part of tbe Gerrr.ans, the'J' were summoned to VersSlilJ.es, 
their counter-proposals having been rejected as f 9St as 
they were offered. A curt ultimatum was issued that they 
should eitber sign without dela-y or there would be a re-
newal of the war.* 
Thus on June 28,19]9, the ~owers of the World met,at 
the 1J all of Mirrors in Vers "illes, in the exact spot where 
the German Empire had been proclaimed in 1871, on th e fifth 
* C. F. liorne,editor - The Great Eyents of the Great War 
George Clemence~u - Lett~r to tbe President of the Germ~ 
Delegation covering the Reply of tne AJlied ~nd Assoc.Powers. 
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anniversary of the historic pistol-shot which killed the 
Austrian liI.rchduke and whjch had ever s';nce filled the world 
with its deli/fening echoes. The Trelilty was read:y 1n almost 
the orih':j_na] form thlilt it hlild been pres ented to the Germans 
on Vay 7. The two ~crmen deleggtes, Be]] and MUller, prlilcti-
cal] y unknown men, signed the Tre~.lty. hll the ori{dn~l 
deleg[ltef" had resigned, refusing to accept the terms of the 
Treaty. Thus was Ede:ned liI Tre~t;y th~t W&E-; to ch~nee +-r-e 
policies, economic, finQncial,9nd political, of practlclill~ 
every nation of l'urope, especially tbose of France and Ger-
many. 
In spite of' the humiliating conditions,Germany was 
forced to sign, she stl11 had her undy ing spiri t. Germ~ny 
hl?rdJy felt tbilt ::!he V/liiS v!;nquished; she felt proud of the 
formidabl e r esistence she had so long op.posed to the entente; 
her armies may h:;ve c:';iven wa-y jn the end, but at lef.ist they 
h~d not known defeat bind she hed alwgys },<ept "the ;, sr v!ithln 
tbe bounds of t,J:"Je enemy's t "'rri tory. ;~·he '.'\Tas conscious that 
her s trenfth in numbers surpas sed tbose of Fr~mce. F'urther-
more, the Germans c'herished at he8rt the convicUon thst sh e 
had a brj fhter future t;b~m P-rance ::;nd +;11e hope that France 
may die because of her oym very victory. 
ThUS, IiIlthough the Germ~_ns seemed humiliated :;ot the 
terms of Versailles, their never dying sf)irit still burned 
Idnd tr:ese acts of France only added fuel to the f1 arne of 
hatred between the two nations. 
Part II 




The PoJicy of Germany 
"In tbe eyes of :;1 J peoples, the iJO] j cies of otter 
nations seem based upon s Ifish considcrliitions, vihile their 
own ~ppf[lr firmly"stRblished on right c;nd reason. But, in 
fact, R]l national policies Fre sjmi1HrlJ founded upon 
pureJy parochi~J estim~tes of domestic intprests ~nd foreign 
dsn~·ers. j',nd, in support of these pol j cies, every people 
employs the mesns it deems most appropriate, dispJEys the 
s I?me unconcern for the effect of its pol icy upon oU'er 
nations, and rejects with utter scorn proposals for amend-
ments ceming f ror.1 abroad. ,~imillOlrl;y, ~lJ peop] es found treir 
progrDmme of peace upon the renunciRtion of weapons useless 
in their own hands, but dangerous in those of others."* 
In keeping ,':i th these principles we m~.y ~~tRte th~t the 
policy of Germany since tbe ')'igr riGS been that. of escape 
from the system of the 'rre~ty of 'v'ers~illes through aboli-
tion of reparetions payments, removal of the unilateral 
dis~rmament circwnstances and, fjnslly thro'lgh revision 
of the territorial clausps of the treaty. 
The terms of the 'l're:olty of VersIii',illes CGme to the Ger-
msn people as an utterl~' incomprebensible decision. In the 
pronouncements of ',ilson they l:;",d seen H;e promise' of a 
generous peace and a prompt restor2+:ion of the German nf1tion 
to its pre-war position. And, :olS a conquence, the compltcat-
ed and terrible conditions of the Psris .2Attlement seemed 
at one time" violRtion of the .11.rmistice terms and the 
* 2imonds -- Can Europe Keep the Peace pg. 129 
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the revelation of a purpose to make German recovery 1m-
possible for tilJ time. As a consequence the Germans have 
adopted tbe above policy. 
First in regard to the Rep~r~tions. Germany was re-
quired to deposit ¢,50,OOG,000 with the Allied Governments 
immed:.tately before the amount of the final sum WBS decided. 
The amount of thls first poyment, hovrever, i::ilve the Germans 
a clue that it would be enormous. Un May 1, 1921, the 
Commission had fixed the German debt !.<t approxim~te1y ~31 
billions. Under this programme, the 9mount due December 
31,1922, ;':ou1d Y9ve amounted to ~1,100,000,000. At this 
time, the CTerm:;ons [1ad p::oid but ~>654,OOC!,000. 'l'he Commission, 
[101JlleVer, unanimous l ;; rFduced ttem for the year of J 92~, 
so trat ;~.875,000,000 wr..s due for tLfJt 20 months period~ In 
the four yeErs' time, Germ£ny hQd p~id in cash and deliveries 
in kind about 1200 mill ion doll ars, about balf of which had 
gone toward costs of the armies of occupation. 01;~!in2_; to 
inter~l]ied arr~ngements, most of the remsinder hed Gone 
to BeJriUln. FrsnceL{,ld r81ized nothlng in liquid form 
which could be applied to her costs of reconstruction. In 
November 1922, Germany aSk for B. lr.or8torium of tbree or 
four years, excepting for certbin deliveries in kind for 
the dev~ststed areas, giving as r~ason the economic condi-
tions of the country. This filled the French ~ith appre-
hension. The British, however, sided with the Germans. On 
thjs rock Britain and France parted. 
Immediately thereafter, the British adopted e policy 
of 2bstaining from the pr5ncipsl debgtes ~nd decisions of 
~\- Office of tr}e Rep:ilr:iltion P~yments - 'l'he Execution of the 
Experts P1:iln to M~y 17,1930 
the ReparaU_Ol1:3 Commission. Germany Has in defau} t on her 
deliveries of coal and other Materials. The R~paration 
Commission decl~red the deffiuJt a voluntary one, and the 
French, supuorted by the Belgians, on January 11,1923, 
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moved into the Ruhr Valley in order to collect, under duress, 
the reparations which Germany, according to the French, were 
wilfully wi tbolding. 'l'he Rubr consti t;'J.ted one of the great-
est coal and industri&l :itr~;},js of the world {Ond '.'ifQS the v(:ry 
heart of economic Germany. GreQt Britain's protest against 
the French action encoursged Germany to declarp it illegal. 
Ruhr t';overnment and fsctory officials, as well as the workers, 
ii/ere exhorted from Oer] in to In lk tht: French des :i.8~ns by 
mc:::;;ns <!J)f the formid:;bJ eveapon of passiveresistence. Against 
this first plan of Poincare's th"t of a sn~all body of ex-
pprts supf'rvising the RuJlr industries and turni:,-e': the profi ts 
into tr,e French treasury, he WfiS obI iged to brhg a v~st 
army across tbe Rhjne in order to set the rec&lcitrant Ger-
mans to ~ork under milit8ry compulsion. The result was 
never in doubt, IOlnd in ::ier'tember 1923, Germ:;ny surrendered 
uncondj ti onQJ] y. The first att~ck upon the Treety of Vpr-
sRil] es hHd faj led.* 
The next point on whj cn tl:e GE:rmans have attempted a 
revision is th~t of trie uni] ateraJ disarmament. In tt'e months 
follow"ng tLe Treaty, the e~lausted and defeated Gpr~any 
looked more J ike a VlOst m~d}'ouse t:rj~n an ord:'Y'ed ci vilized 
soc iety ."i tb th0:l r seemIng-solid inherited institutions 
falling about -tll€ir el3rs the st[~rved, disillusioned, and 
war-shocked people clutched wildly at ~ny straw th~t appeQr-
~~ Noyes ~nd Fuller - The French occupation of the Ruhr 
,. 
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ed to offer spcurity aga:l.nst immediate destruction.* An-
other rr'volution I'Tas hlngl1ing. A communist revol t occurred 
in tree neutr&11.zed terri tory ~long the Rhine • .in order to 
put do:n the revolt, the Germ:..n GoverrL'TIent requested per-
mission to move troops into the area. ':;ithout waiting 
Rutr:,orization, the Germans marched 20,OGO men into the liOrea 
and overcame the revolution. The French protested. 
Difficulties @lso arose over ~ircr~ft. The Treaty pro-
hib! ted Germ9ny from h:.ving any rriJ 1.tary airpJ anes. But 
'Nhat l,'Vas tie differAncc between mil itsry and cormw,rcia1 
pJanes'? Gprm~n-y fjnRlly resched an agreement to the effect 
that planes having cert~in qualities of speed and strength 
were to be re8arded as military planes and hence prohibited. 
Like1Nis'o, quest:ir·ns lIl.rose [,s to tbe m&int:;linence of 
armed police forces. 'l'be d~nger of revolution liInd of crime 
follovJing t1 e armi stice in 1918 became so great tbet the 
Ger:1:.ans est&b] isbed several ne':] police orgf'-nizatiur:s. Tbese 
forces ,vere fully h rmed and the li1] ied Governrr.(~nts soon 
said that itlv'as a military force, the existence of which 
violated the peace treaty. Likewise the ~llies complained 
at the end of 1920 tbat Germlilny had fa:i led to destroy a 
large quantity of :;Jrms. in answer to these protcsts, it was 
stated that it VIRS ethic:a1ly unsound and physicsll,- :tm-
possible to fiittempt to keep the l:.rgFst nat:ton :in Europe 
:tn a pros tr2te condj t ion, w1"l:tle her ne ighbors armed to 
their heart's desire. 
*Schevi11- A History of Europe pg. 753 
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As to the revision of the t erri tori~l b01mdHrle s, the 
Germans were stopped. Their only victory WQS in the pleb-
iscites: In the Schleswig zones, the southern section elect-
ed Germ~_ny, in eQstern Prussia both plebiscite areas went 
to Germ~ny: in Upf:er '::;i1esia ttw plebiscj te went to Germany, 
but the allies were resolved that this rich mining ~nd 
industrial area should not rem" in with GermanJi ~md insj sted 
on dividing it between Germany and Pollmd in such ::1 -.nq 
th~t the over'Nhe1ming preponderance of its coal ~nd zinc 
mines ~ere h~nded over to the resuscitated Slav St~te. 
'·ith all these eVRsions stopped Germ~ny rem~ins--and 
rema~ns--unshaken, lind German po1ic;y is still for revislon. 
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Chapter II 
The .tolicy of France 
As has frequently been pointed out, a continous insis-
tence on security is the dominlmt moti ve of the French 
pol icy. Tl:e ins} stence, logj ca] E'lDough in its essentials, 
seems on its p"rticuJars to amount to an absession. Yet 
what the French actually me~n by security is neither quite 
simple, nor by any mBlilns self evident. lt is not, for exam-
ple, merely" question of frontj.ers, arm'es or limited 
guarantees. hn the contr:ory, it is primarily the French 
desire of the establishment in Europe of a system of order. 
And, quite naturlilllJ', tr~eir system of order conforms to 
French conception. 
Clemenceau, thus, "t the P~ace Conference made every 
effort to insure Fr:;;nce security. "He was Unimpressed by 
lNilson's idealistic progrlilmme, wllich #lilS the :Lclil.gue of 
1"lat10ns, ;md he was unconvinced by Foch's prescription of 
permlilnent occ;pation of the left b~nk of the hhine. he 
regarded the former scheme as Utopian, &nd the latter as a 
vagary of a milit~r) mind. For him the single formula of 
security was the preservation of the war time associations 
of bis 0'1V!l countr) with the two English-speaking nations."~r 
He tl,())ught that he had realized this when it was incl uded 
in the Treaty of Verslililles, but when the United States 
SAnate rejected it/ the rrrelilty of GUarantee fell lilDd 
Clemenceliu's pol icy -;"fas jn ruins "nd Lis own po] i tiCR] 
c~reer was at an,end. 
* Frank Simonds -- Cm Europe Keep the Peace? pg. 157 
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The international relations of Europe until recentl-y 
have been based on the principle of the Bal&nce of Power. 
This WBS the dividing up of the nations b~ alliances, since 
they could no longer be di vided into states of equal miJ i tary 
:;ond economic power, to tbe point th&t no Stliit~ vould be 
able single-banded to impose its will upon the rest of the 
world. Such was H'e c~se ~;,t the beginning of the Gre~t 
1
c
-ar. ln 1917 the situation sudd nlJ c(;t;;ngedi +;he TSIiI_r of 
Russia w~s overthrown; Russia flithdrew from the war; a 
Bolshevist Government c~me into Vower; it rppudigted the 
oblig~tions of the old r 0 [ime RDd proclaimed its intention 
of bringing on iii world revolution. Hussia, t:ne ally of 
France, had become the enemy. The French therefore, believe 
that there is ('snrer tbat these two outcast st&tes of 
Europe -- Russia IiInd Germany -- might form an alliance to 
overturn the 'ferslilill es settJ ement, md dominate the con-
t1nent. Under these impulses of the B:ill.nce of Power con-
ceptions ~nd believing in the implacable hatred of Ger-
many, French policy aimed to keep Germ~ny weak Fnd to find 
new ~llies to bolster up the Frencb position to offset 
Germany1s superior man-power. 
Thus 'Ne see J:<'rance in the next period negotiating with 
the powers of England, BeJ gium, f'ollOnd, Luxemburg, and the 
new Slavic States for treaties of defense ~glOinst Germany 
or to SArve as allies for her. ~he tried to get the League 
to establish an int'rnational army, !:Ind Britain and the 




"1.th Germ:ilny temporliolrily crippled by disliolrm:ilmfmt and 
economic barriers, France set out to hunt for :illlies. The 
first WliolS the smQII stQte of Del gium, who had suffered 
from the GermQD jnvliIsion :ilnd bad failed to get her desires 
gr~nted Qt the fCQce Conference in regard to ~erritorial 
exp:ms ion and the con trol of the mouths of her two ri vers, 
the Scbeldt Qnd ~he Meuse, her only outlets by VV2i~er to 
the ~'eQ, vIr,icn were held by Holl ~md fOnd Luxdll.burg respective-
I y (see mlilp on next plilge~). Thus in 2,eptember 1920, the 
French Qnd BeJgium military stQffs drew up a m~litQry 
Qgreement providing for reciprocal :ilid in CQS~ of QttQck. 
The questj.on as to the legQlity of the tre:ilty immediQtely 
Qrose. rEhe LeQgye of l~ations Coverant provided that Ie] I 
tre8ties should be registereci Qt GeneVQ. 'l'his, the French 
liInd BeJp'ium Governmf'nts dec" ined, in fgct tr:ey pven re-
fused to publ ish the text of tbe document. 'J'hey simply 
registered some lettf)rs stating t~i:;;;t such :il.Yl~· greement had 
been entered into. It ~as defensive ~g&inst Germany in CBse 
eitl'erw.as liolttLcked b~' her. 'rhe French followed this up 
with an economic :;lE~reemen t wt.i ch would tie the two countries 
more c i osely togeU:er. Thus we hQve .B'rwcedth her first 
QIIy. * 
Next c~me PolQnd. It has alrE,Qd) been shown thliOt Frfolnce 
WQS responsible mliOinly for the creation of tbi s st8te to 
~ct as iii buffer between Germlilny "nd RussiQ. lt 'iQS n:iltural 
for Poland to seek::> id from France, :;md it ',diS naturQI for 
France to ask Qid from Poland in time of war with either 
Russia or Germ&n7j becRuse of rol:md's strategic loc~tion. 
l~i------------------------------------------------------------------
* L1nds~~ Rodgers - The Keystone of French Foreign Policy 
~-
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"In 1920 France rushed aid to Poland before any :il.lliance 
had been made -- the occ~sion being war between ~ol:il.nd ~nd 
Russia. In February 1921, the situation was consolida.ted 
by the signing of a politic~1 lilgreement betv'ieen Poland and 
France in which they :.ogreed to act together in ~l questions 
of foreign policy relating to the regulation of internatipn-
al affpirs, in the spirit of the peace treaties lilnd in con-
formity with the Covensnt of t:he Le:.o.gue of bs.tions."* 
This agreement, like th:.o.t: with Belgium, w:.o.s followed by a 
commercililJ trc-:.o.t:y operline the two countries' m:.o.rkets Gt 
:.0. low t~riff. Fr~nce also forwarded :.0. Jo~n of ~lOO,OOO,OOO 
to Poland. She had saved the Poles, she now becsme the 
gUlilr~ntor of their cxist"'mce, Gnd the strong Polish IO.rmy, 
presently to rise, would moasurab1e repllilce the Russi~n on 
the eli/stern frontiers of Germany. For the construction of 
tLis policy, the f:o.mous fvlillerlO.nd is mainly responsible. 
His policy found '[.rider extension under his successors 
in Czecho-SJ ovakia, Yugo-Slavia IO.nd Rummia. In J:il.nuary 1924, 
the French Government signed 8n ~JJiance 'fIith Czecho-
[:'lovlillria in r.:;gard to ~lDy attewpted union of Gerrrany IO.nd 
AustrilO. or in C~SF; of ~ny questions Gri s·j ng ref-:'E,rdi ng their 
security or that of the pe:o.ce trcRties. This a~roement was 
not m'lit:;.ry as in the CLse of tIle Belgium alliance. Sjmi11O.r 
a.grrements were en' '~red into wi thYugo-::'l:.o.via IO.nd Rum~nia. 
Thus the Little Entente became 1ike P01and, not only a 
mD itary, but a d:iplor:~tic bulwark of .brencrl policy. "But 
on the othpr hand, French po] icy itse1f was now definiteJy 
~~ Buell -- Europe. A History of 'ren Years pg. 67 
This map indicates the position of Bel~ium and 
Holland. The control"of the mouths of the Meuse, 
ScheIdt and the Rhine are all held by Holland. It 
is also to be noted that these are practically the only 
accesses that Belgium has to the sea. 
The provinces of Eupen and Malmedy are plebiscite areas 
that were given to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles. 
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emblilrked upon t:he defence of the stlil,tus quo, not only on the 
Rl;ine, but on the Vi stulil.l, the DIiIlube, &. nd even the Dniesterl"-l:-
Along with the IiIbove allililnc€s Frlince h&d hopes of iii 
reviv~l of the ill-fated aJlilince of 1919 with 1nglRnd. FrEnce 
hgd vtished Ii cleRr-cut ::J·fre·"lt1fcnt ",'.1 tl LEi ~ ~'!I:dv' r !' ince U e 
Entente Cordi~le, &'nd ljad f~n:21lj obttincd :it jr~ the Tr'~8ty 
of Guerr.nty, cnl y to hgve it dr shed to l)ieces by the re-
fusli1 of the United ~tlites ~enlilte to rgtify it. Negotililtions 
were mlide for iii. defensi ve tre"t~ w1.th Eq:~,1 ~md ~)[~;j nst Ger-
mRny, but FrGnce considered them one-sided bec2use the Bri-
tish refusod to accept the incJusion of Po11i1.nd in the de-
fr,nsive clause. The British 0Pl-i0sed this inclusion of.l'ollillld 
bec~use they considered Poland iii. protege of France - R~ 
artificial crefiition tl~Qt threatened the British position 
in the o iii 1 t ic. JI t C ~nnes in 1922, gn gIl ilince was di scus sed 
lit length, only to end in fliilure bec~use of this irrecon-
ci1~ble difference oveI' tbe PoJish frontier. Finlil.1 1 y, after 
other ~ttempts ~t negotiations, Poincare broke the Entente 
Cordj~le by jnv£ding tbe Ruhr ~nd by seeking fUI'thcI' con-
tinent:.] IiIJ] ililncBs. 
~~ Simmonds -- Can Eur'ope Keep the t'cace? pg .159 
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The Rhineland and the Ruhr Invasion 
The Rhine River flows through ':estern Europe in sucb 
iii mlOnner tlult it j s cons idered bJi the Prench ~s iii nsturlill 
bound~n; betwe-n Frsnce ~nd Germ:;ny despi te the flOCt that 
the French have only had control of this ~rea but once. 
The GerrnQns hsve held to tris territor~ throughout the 
centuries, sxcept in tr:e ClOse above mentioned when N"poleon 
rAliIlized the long-deeired French policy. This territory, 
usually referred to IiIS tho Rhineland territory, is the 
very helilrt of tl:e Germ:'Il industrial world :md is ~lso very 
rich in minerals. ~~1s territory w~s still in dispute at 
the close of tte Great tlilr as can be seen by the decision 
about Alslilce-Lorr~ine. The province of Als~ce IiInd plilrt of 
that of Lorrliljne are bordered by the Rhirie. ThUS, by the 
return of tr,Ase two to Fr:;mce, R p:.:rt of her policy was 
realized. There remained, however, the R~lr territory.* 
The economic factor, which gives the brench some basis 
other ttliln imlerilillism for tt€ desire to control the Ruhr, 
is lWQbl@lt In lilt thls point of outstRndlng importlmce. The' 
iron deposits of },urope lie in tLe proviLces of I~J S9.ce IiInd 
Lorra~n(~ 1,":h:iJe tIl(' cOBl deposits lie in tJ:e Ruhr. Both gre 
more 8dv~ntsfeous if controlled by one soverejgnty. Economi-
c~lly, it is more advantageous to bring the coal to the 
iron fer industry. lience, Fr&nce, sjnce she OTmS the iron 
deposits, consjders it her right to control the coal ~reas 
~- Parker T. Moon - Imperifoilism and Vwrld fol j tics - Chapter 
17 - Part 2 
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AnottJer flilctor to rel-rlcJ11ber i2 tocd the nstions of the 
world ~re r&ted ~s gre~t by their domln~nce in trsde, in-
dustry, and intf'rn~Jtion~e1 Slfffiirs. it is ~:: 80 ~ proven 
theory th~t these dominant n~tions 'prov:i.de tbe vvor1d with 
co~l. For inst~nce, in 1913, the United ~tGtes, Gre~t brit~in, 
and Gerr"liny supp1 ied tte worl d w:i th 81~6 of tLe co 8J used 
th~t ye~r. The tOt9] output of tte co~l of Germ&n~ grd the 
:;lre~s :'Vnence it CBme were; 
Als9ce-Lorr~ine •••••••••• 3,800,000 tons 
S9(lr B:;lsin .••••••••••••• 13,200,000 tons 
Upper ~i]esi~ ••••••••••• 43,800,000 tons 
'l'he Ruhr ••••••••••••••• 130,700, OGO tons 
Tot~l for Germ~ny in 1913 ••• 191,500,000 tons * 
FrQnce realJ) did h9ve some re,son to bc'ieve th~t Germ'ny 
w~s f~st 9ppr09cb1ng her if not &lrf~dy her equsJ in the 
qu~lific8tions for ~ greater ~,nd more domin:;>nt power. Il\jdthin 
a I~~enerliltion (tbis refers from the tirr;e wLcn Gerc'!9n;y' 
:ilcquired the i,] s~ce-j-orndne terri tory in 18.7J) Gerrumy bliid 
by 'peaceful penetration' entered the ~~rknts of tbe 
world. ~pheres of iri'l uence iC'-re stGked. off in s(;me 1 ~nds; 
coloni e s ,',cere cbt:;; in ed in otters. oln comrwn vri th her 
policy of imperilO1ism. Every conthlent felt the touch of 
Gerrrr.n Kultur; every se~ c{jlrried 9rgosies under tbe Germ~n 
Flap;. 'hat Bis'l12rck }-q;d done :;I.t IJcme "',ith b100d ~;rd iron, 
bls successors detArmjnedl~o do abr08d ,;jt:} coal ~nd iron."~H~ 
~:- John Ii:1:ii;y-n9.rd Keynes, 'rl1e Economic CQIlS(;Quencp,s of the .LeSee 
pg.88 
J,H~ Henry l~obJ e Sherwood, ""The Territori,,"l ~nd Fconomic Roots 
" 1 . 8 of the Ruhr /1'4 t:tudie s in Ar.,8ric 9n -a story, pg. 33 
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If these 'Ner' the instruments by i,hicr.i G0:rnulDY hlild 
become the rivsl of Fr~nce, France cert~inlJ put gn end to 
them ~t ~ers~illes. A1slilce-Lorraine was r~turned to Frpnce, 
the .c: aar m 1n es vere p'i vpn to n er lOnd t:Ho sovereignty of 
th~t territory to the Learue, Upper Silesia WBS tsken from 
Gpr'T~ny end 1,,,,ft to ~ pl E:'bescite, Iii 1] the Ger~'1'f!n colonies 
were taken, the spteres of influence dissolved wnd the 
Gern~:;m nlilvy surrendered or destroyed. r1'he only Iilsset of 
those nlilmed above left to Gcr!fl:;my ''''!filS t:ne Hul1r. 
:i.'lOVI/ that the '1Irp~ty had be(~n signed France, J ooking 
over German), s~w this gnd decided thlilt she needed it more 
then Germany.~· 
'ith repgrl#tions :;JS the main bs::d s France occupied 
the Rul1r on J~nugry 11, 1923. ~)he rrsde this decis:ion on 
several grounds. ~oinc~re stated the French views in a 
note to the Germ:;ms, Jul 'J' 30. It re gd: IlThere must be no 
m:i sunderst.anding about our j,urpose 1 n the Rubr; there is 
no ques tion of seeking there the jmmecji&te ~nd tot:.l pay-
ment of rep2ra t jons; ~E knew very well that tte exploita-
tion of the T\uhr bJ the ./-',11ies ',1/ou1 d not by j tSAl f ~none 
procure the necessary sums, even ift-;he GcrcrFn Government, 
in conformity with the tresty of peace, ~ad allowed us to 
take the coal and COl] cct t:ne t~xes v,.e had dt-;cided to Jevy 
there. Sh~t we desired first Dnd especiallJ w~s to cr 0 ste 
in' Germ~ny by the seizure of pL:dpes snd by coercion, the 
w,ilJ to pay; to crF'fjte sucr; embsrrassmen t in the econo~-r;ic 
:;ind politic~l structlJ.re of t.he Ed.ch th2-!-; the' execution of 
the tr 9ty ','10U1 d be preferred to ~;l:i s emb&r:rassmen t; to 
.. ~ Cooke and [':tickney - Re;iH'I1n~s in EUrOpefilD- International 




obt~in wh:o;t· -.'e n:..ve not obtained for t.he 1:;~3t four years, 
namely, the recognition of Germ~ny of her obliga+:,ions, not 
from the e;eneral 8nd theoretic poi.nt of view lIrut from the 
practic~l point of vie','!. "-1:-
Poincare bad in 'ind tbe def8u1 t 8 of Germ~my in her 
repDr&tion pa,';ml'lnts. TYe first default came in lVlay, 1921. 
By the rrc;lce Trelilty, Gprmlttny WlilS to pa.y :;:-5,000,000,000 in 
gold of which she only paid ~1,250,000,000. By the decision 
of the Reparliltions Commission of May, 1921, Germ~IDY mils to 
pay dur5ng tbe ye"rs 1921 and 1922 an :annulil sum of $500, 
000,000, plus a sum eqm11 to 26% of her pxports, wbich l:.-tter 
sum hlild berm estimated very conservatively at ~:500,OOO,OOO 
lil year. This made s tot91 of E2,000,000,OOO for the two 
years. vf this Germany paid 4500,OOO,OCO, v.hlch was :mother 
default. Germany :;<lso def:,.ulted in her Pfi~lr.lpnts of c021 lind 
wood to France. Of the /ij1most 14 million tons of co~l she 
was Sllpposed to deliver in 1922, France only received a 
little over 2 million tons. This Jast default led to the 
decision t~kt=:n in the inv~sion uf the Huhr valley. France 
fplt right in dojn~ th~s because the Pe~ce Treaty provided 
that in c~~;e of lil·dl:L'ul defa.ult, the nations elm [;0 in and 
t8ke econom~c, f1D8nc1t1 Lnd any ot~8r s~nctions that they 
desire to take. This dpcisioD W9S rost serious, however, 
because the Rrench, in occupy ing trle Ruhr, drew deliberately 
QVfgy from :t:ne1:md, who VJas strongl y opposed to any such 
:!'lction. 
The Germgns recei ved this strgnglllatH;n:. of' their in-
* Henri Lichtenberger rllne Ruhr Conn ict -- pg.3 
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dustrial center by the }i'rench militLry forces lOS iJ legal, 
pi.rr]t;iC}'J], brutr,;] Jy imperi81 istic !and ruinous, not only to 
GArmany but to the rest of Europe. It is evidsnt that 
therr:: v"Fe' a r~dic~l difference between the .brench and Ger-
man points of view. 
The Gert!19.ns arc ~ nized and detcrm).ncd to res] st tDe 
French act ion "lith "pss s1 ve rc s is tarnce". The French were 
just as rr:so1 ved in +-beir Rction and the Cr nf} ict became 
of ~ vitliilly serious chBrGcter. 
The result was thlilt Germ~n tr:.de collapsed under the 
crushing weipht of the burdens imposed by the Rubr conflict. 
1"ith these two functions, thE') industry and the trade, cut, 
the fjYl~nces of GeI'm&:ny col] apsed also. 'l'hus, France f:-.11-
ed to obt:aj n the end she sought Hid liil so 1 earned that for ce 
was a weapon of the past. From this time on a change can 
be seen in the French policy.* 
-4:- From a person:.oJ interviewd th 8ir Herbert Ames, lV;ini ster 




The Dawes Plan and Germany 
In occupying the Ruhr in J anu~ry 1923, F'rfmce had 
exacted her pound of fJAsh snd obliged Germany to surren-
der. '<:he h~.d forced German finlilnce into bankruptcy and had 
brougr:t about, or induced tIle Germ~ns to br'ing about, the 
complete social and economic disorgfnization of the Heich. 
By the end of AUEust 1923, the Germans had reached the end 
of their tether ~nd made an abject submission. The govern-
ment had paid the helil.vy bill of p~ssive rf;sistance by 
running off more ~nd more paper marks from t.he printing 
presses untj] it took millions Iilnd even hundreds of millions 
to buy an Americ:;1n dollar, wheras, in pre-war days, the 
dollar was quoted as a 1 ittle more than four. 'rhe national 
treasury WS.S nov! banvrupt and the entire individual savings 
wiped out, leaving Germany a nation of paupers. Business too, 
vras at a shmdstill bec~mse of the worthlessness of the 
mark ~nd t.he f~ct thet German trade :had been cut off from 
the rpst of thn world since the outbreak of the 'l~ar. 
The hope of a prOlnpt stgbil ization of }<,urope had 
rested upon tl:e Anglo-French entente. 'l'hat hope had long 
since disappeared in a wel tAr of recrimi nlilt.ions. rrhe~ng] ish 
were loud in their denunciation of the l:'rench OCC'.l.p~.tion of 
the Ruhr:~ The effect of tbis out/-cry hardened tbe French 
and they determined to stand pat. 
IlAmong the Gerrrans, organized resistancE'" to tl10 occupa-
tion had ceased Iii th the brmkruptcy of t.heir government. But 
-J,:. Cooke and t t ickne;; - Re~.d1.ngs in :&'uI'ope Gn Intel"'n.t ional 
Relations - Page 938 - The Dawes Report 1904 
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GermQ.n resentment s t II 1 glo':/ed ,vi th Q.n intense heQ.t. :::'uper-
ftctally, Q.t leRst, tt ~ppeRred Q.s strong 88 the deep 
sense of unredressed injury which RnimQ.ted t.he people of 
Frlilnce. "* 
In MQy 1923, Germlolny lilsked th:;>t the reparstion question 
be referred to Q.n internRtionlill body of experts. Britain 
VIRS in fQ.vor of this Rnd invited the United .'::Jtatps t,o 
pertic1.pRte in thi s inquiry to det'rmine Germany's c:;<paci t-y 
to pRy. Fr&nce w&s re]uct~nt lilt first but the acute 
finQ.ncial s1tut<t10n forced her to enter. in November 1923, 
the ReplilrliltionsCommission f:7stabl ished two C', "'mi ttees of 
experts from various countries, th€' first to study the 
means of balancing the GermQ.n budget liind of stlf.bi1izing 
the mQ.rk; the s8cond icVRS to determine the Q.mount of GermQ.n 
clitpi t ,,1 exported Q.broild &nd the pOS:3 i ble met;:lOds of bring-
ing it bRck to Germlilny. 
The hmericans th&t served on this Commission were 
Owen D. 'loung, henry'. Hobinson, ~md General ChQ.rles G. 
DQ.vies, vl'hence the nQ.me the 'DQ.wes .t'lRn'. These men served 
wi thout official connection 1/-'1 th the United States Gov ern-
mente 
The Committee met in .t'lilris in the eQ.rly spring of 1924. 
Their pJ&n w&s outlined Q.S two-fold; first to study the 
Currency; :and second to study the Budget. Th8 first ttlsk of 
the experts '.'1IilS to deterrrdne how much Uie G';;rlmm people 
should be Q.sked to paJ. ~he Dlilwes Plan WRS necessarjly 
intricQ.te in its actulill details. its mlilin feQ.tures ~ere, 
~~ Auld -- Th,e Dlil.wes F1Q.n Iil.nd the New Economics -- pg.33 
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wholly 
by contr~st, very simpJe. ~t W~SA9n economic plan 
fO.lthough "politic91 considerations necBss9rily set certain 
limits within which a solution must be found." 
As a result of tbts inflRtion, Germany had wiped out 
its domestic debt. The victorious nations, by contrRst, 
since they were meeting tbe costs of their domestic debts, 
wou] III be unfairly h9ndic~pped in the 1Norld markets, if 
they were compell ~;d to compete with German production, 
freed of all domestic taxatj_()ll reSl 1 t:ing from the war. rrhus 
the D~wes Commission took 9S its basic principle that 
equ:;llity of burdens IJbould be the melOlsure, hence the princi-
pIe of "comrnensurlilte taEation." 
The first measure of the Co~nission was to put Germ~ny 
back on her financial feet by an international loan of 
$200,000,000. This was to be provided by tbe foreign market 
of bonds, chiefly in tbe United ~tlil.tes and britQin. A por-
tion of this fl1UTI WIiiilS to be retGilned in Germ:;my to support 
the rentem9rk, tbe b:;;l ~nce w,," s to supply p9-rt of the funds 
necessary for reparations p&yments dur~ng tbe e ... rJy period 
when direct German contributions must be inconsid8rable. 
There was created Iiiil central bro.nk of issue, subject to 
foreign supervision,:hicb, in ro.ddition to issuj_nr currency, 
was to conduct all tbe complic::.ted operatlon of financing 
the de] i veries in kind on account of reparations, recei ving 
from tbe government the necesstilry funds. 
Lastly, the Dro.wes Plan provided for the payment of 
reparations on Iiiil sl iding scale, which started witb ~250 
million for the flrst year, ~300 miJlion for the second 
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and third, and rosr, to ~;625 million in the fifty. There 
wss ~lso estQblished ~t this base a principle that ~~ no 
time should any pa:VlI'.ent in c8sh or kind be made when such 
p~yment threatened to disturb German exchange. 
~wing to her present bankr.uptc-y and to the firumcial 
scepticism wilich this condition ent~iled, other features of 
the Plan put Germany under foreign tutelage by obliging 
her to accept allied control of her railroads, and a speci-
fied group of revenues in addition to tbe contro1 of the 
bank of issue. 
"Broad]y speaking, the Dawes flan thus proposed to fix 
Iil. scale for German payments based on GermlOlTI caplil.ci ty and 
safcg:uarding German intprests. lH the same time it f'srgb-
lished the principle that;, subject to bonest endea.vour and 
reasonabl e fuJ fillment, Germany should be once for :;0] 1 freed 
from a]] thre&t of foreign coercion, assured not only 
mastery wi thin ber own frc,ntiers, but protection against 
all intervention. "~~ 
The approval by France of the lJawes t'lan marks the 
beginning of Il change in her policy towards the reparliltion 
question. rJ.1here are probabJ y several reasons for tlijs 
clu.nge. First is that of the \\ashingtpn Conference, where 
FrIlnce received her first; blow by being put on a b@sis with 
Italy ~nd by being ranked as a tIdrd rlilte naval pOllver. 1''he 
second blow clil.me at Cannes when the German delegate 
reiterated the inlilbj 1 i tJl of ld.s country to meet the r"purs-
tions due and was granted a moratorium. 'J.1he third event is 
~:- Simonds -- How Europe Made Prace ','itbout America -- pg292 
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marked by the French Occup:iltion of the Ruhr. This move 
definitely hardoned the British feeling toward France :ilnd 
it ~lso proved to Frhnce th~t force was a weapon of the past. 
At this same time the condition of French finances were in 
such a state that this too proved :iln j'1portant reason for 
the }'rench sanction of the }'xperts Plan. 
liThe supreme me ri t of the Dawe s 1-'l:m ] fF,'f in th e f a.c t 
th:ilt it definitely removed the reparations issue from 
politics. The Ger~an dem~nd for an expert Bnd scientific 
determination of Germ~n c~p~city to pay 'Nas satisfied 
absolutely. ~n the other hand, the French contention that 
Germany could pa;i and must pay was simi 1 ~rl;:i sustained. 
~'ince, moreover, the schedule fixed by the London ultimatums 
of 1921 had provided that Gernumy should pay $250,000,000 
in 1921 and $500,000,000 in succeeding ye:ilrs, the actual 
reduction was not con siderable. tI~:-
But the moral v~lue of the Dawes Ylan surpassed the 
material. It cut down the compl:\.clilted and contr8dictory 
provi S1 ons, of the Vers ,dlles Tre~ty into If s j mple !;nd 
stra ightfor'iJard programme, gi vinE the Germ=-ns a definite 
contrDct \filth a d;m light of national recovery and the in-
surance IiIgal nst interference, ; Ihile it gave the French, as 
well as the otber Allies, an a.ssur~nce of the payment of 
the reparations. 
'rIle D:iilwcsl bin was adopted Q t Londo~' by the fillies and 
Germany in }\.ugust 1924. Germany almost immediately turned 
the corner to her recovery, slthough it WQS destjned to be 
J,~ Simonds )iOW Europe M~de .t'eliOce ,'lithout America -- pg.293 
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slow. Yet it is eesenti'al to recognize that no country p~ssed 
through ~ period of prostration as complete :ilS thlOt of Ger-
many in 1923 and 1924. !lowhere was misery so general, n6-
where was suffer:ing so univeraal. "No proud people had ever 
been forced to endure greater humil istion. l~ot}jing of 
ph;;sicaJ or menb.l suffering lu.d been spared the jnh~bitants 
of the /reat cities. Nor is it an exaggeration to saJ that 
the limit of humlOn endurlilnce l,ad been reached. Never was 
a race between ultimate ruin and possible recovery more 
closAly run. ilctually the slOlvation of the Daw0s llliln arrived 
at the eleventh hour."* 




In Europe at this time there were two ~ajor problems--
security and econorric revival. The Dawes Plan was ~jmed at 
the second of ~hese pro~lems. The security problem remained 
to be der.oJt 1;'dth. Fr:.nce demanded it. Germany, totally dis-
armed, needed it, having experienced the invasion of the 
Ruhr and t}ie Rhine] and revolt. F'r~nce cons ide red the -young 
Lea['ue an experiment and fc~red that it m' glit be too weak 
to procure its ends. For t},is reflson sbe had gone her o'.vn 
way by renewing the ver';/ sy st em, favored bef'ore 1914, of 
su.rrounding Germany with a ring of iron. ,ith the adoption 
'of the DSiOwes flan came tbe feeli.ng tt'at if a politicsl 
agreement could be made with her ancient foe it would be a 
more eff~ctive method of obtainjLg security than either 
the League or the miJit&ry ring. 
Germany, under the able le:i<dership of ~.tref'emsnn,b ad 
abandoned her policy of' bastern~Urientation gnd passive 
resistence wben she real ized t.rlSt ber immediate problem 
was to restore the independence of her people b-y obtsjning 
the evacuation of ber national soil, the abolition of 
financial control lilnd the return to the councils of Furope 
on tbe footing of a great power.* 
The first attempt at tbis politic~l Qgreement WRS the 
Geneva Protocol. This protoGol was cre~ted as a result of 
the P.sE;embly's requestthatthe Gouncil of the .L82fue of Nations 
draw up a plan for lOn ~ vre c'm8nt in '.'Jnich each st.ate 
would promise to give "imrnf)di~te '"-nd efff;ctive" assist'"-nce 
~.!_ c:; oddre1=!s to 7th ordinarv session of the Assembly 
..... ,tresemlifnn -... - " 
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to the victim of liOn unprovoked lii.ttlii.ck. 'fhe first line of 
tIlis trelii.ty decllii.red, IIAggressive 'Nlii.r is ~-n~nternlii.tionliOl 
crime. 1I Tbe framers found it difficult to determine the 
lii.ggressor in Iii. given c~se, ~nd the tre:.t-y simply provided 
th~t within four da-ys after hostilities break out the 
Council should render 9 decision. Grelilt Britlii.in opposed it, 
stressing that it forwarded the idelii. of force rather than 
justice. Ramsey MgcDon~ld, British prime minister, present-
e4 his views of universal peace on the ;rounds thlilt security 
could onl-y be attlii.ined by n9tions 9greeing to submit thetr 
disputes to courts of llii.w ['nd to abide by the decision. 
France disagreed, bringing out the point the pledged word 
of nlii.tions '.'1:;18 not enough. Theunis, the Belg:ipn prime minis-
t er, support ed the French by saying, "Gi ve us 9n ~. s sur~mce 
of s9fety and we Belgians will gladly dismiss our soldiers, 
but can you expect us to risk our security on 'i,'ords alone, 
again Qnd so soon?" 
Tr~ Geneva t'rotocCiJl result~d from the combined points 
of fu9cDonald's arbritration Gnd rlerriot's security. By the 
other .polnts of the Ilgre0ment the prjnciples of Disa.rmament 
S~curity, and Arbitration were 9ttempted to be r0lillizedin 
a unified form. It Wf,/S undoubted]~· the most 9mbi tious pe:oce 
plan ever djscussed • .1.t, however, f~lled to galn accept{;lnce 
because it 92ked more than the gre9t powers ere ready to 
concede. The British view W&S infJueDced by the fear thQt 
it would endQnger tbe close co-operation between the British 
Empire limd the United ':'tates thlii.t had l'een their m:dn-st:ilY 
since tbe Great ~ar. Germany was not included since this 
" 
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was inter-:fjeague. This propos.l, nevf~rtheJess, had its 
effect in the change of atmosphere that it brought over 
Europe+.· The poisoned atmosphere of the 1914 perlhod had been 
injected with a new spirit of conciliation. * 
Stresemann and Luther, the Chancellor of Germa.ny, set 
out to sol ve the immediate problem of Germlmy as has been 
given above. Their first move w~s to neg.tiate with the 
Great Powers. A note to the n lied governments on February 
9,1925, suggested that France, .ltSil1y, Germany, and Great 
Bri t a j n enter ". solemn obligation not to v:~ge;'lar IOlglOinst 
each other; and tlH..t this bbligliltion sl10uld be liu"'siJ..med v:ith 
the United ~tates acting as trustee; also the recognization 
by Germany of a stliltus quo on the western bound~ry bet'Vveen 
Fr:mce IiInd herself. Tl-'is note immedilftely met with &pproval 
in EngJand and from. t.he outset British supnort of the 
Stresema.nn proposal W&s assured. The French voice was not 
of whole-hearted approv~l because the eastern boundlilry of 
Germany '.'HlS excluded. 'l'hus tbe eastern frontiers of GermQny 
dominated all the discussion before the LocGrno Conference. 
A change cGme, however, in U,e French policy by the return 
of Briand to the quai d'Orsay. Briand and Stresem~mn con-
tinued the negotations where Herriot had left off and by 
October everythjng Vias set for the Conference and it was 
called lilt Locarno, Switzerland, Represent!iitives of Germany, 
~rance, Great Bri tlidn, Poland, Belgi1JlIl, Czecho-S1avlilkia, 
and It~ly were present. 
In two weeks the five Locarno Pacts WRre signed. Four 
of the five treaties were no more thane greements between 
* Cooke and Stickney - Readings in European InternationQl 
Relations - P~ge 926 - The Geneva Protocol 1924. 
p 
72 
Germany on the one band litnd ber neighbors, Belgium, Frlitnce, 
PoJ and, ald Czecho-f:!lovlitkilit on the other, to submit 1it11 
future issues to arbitrlittion. 
Tte fifth document WIitS t:he ~:E'curi ty plitct, ",hich con-
tinued Germ~n litnd French pledfes to litccept the territori~l 
stptus quo crelitted in the west b:,' the 'l'resty of Versailles, 
and the Germlliiln promise to observe the condit iens 'Ni th respect 
of the demilitlitrized zone cont:;tined in the s~.me cO:'Ypact. 
Great Britain litnd Italy also joined in gUlitrlliilnteeing this 
Eecurity Plliilct. Gc;rma;ny litnd Belgium, and Germ;;;.nJ and Fr~nce 
mutually litgreed not to litttack, invade, or resort to ~ar 
Iit£:oinst elliilch otber. TIis Yrelitnt that Germany liibandon8d all 
hope of regaininf~ Alsace-Lorrlliiline and th"t the great stgtes 
gave tLeir gUliir~ntee t.o the Rhinellliilnd frontiHr.?~ 
Although from the technical standpoint the l'act is 
full of loopholes, its signlficlitnce litrises out of the spirit 
of coneD iation in wt j Cr-l tbe conference vIas held and the 
tr~aties dr:iifted. This ~as import~nt because; thls was the 
first time that GRrTn:ony clitd been received in the council of 
ngtions as :;In equal; it was the first time that; the pt&:tes-
men of the vreat ststcs h:;;d:ork€',d together under conditjons 
of peace; :md it WIIiiIS tree initial occasion'ihen the stlliiltes-
men of the severlitl countries worked togetherd. t:t the 
sense, not of ending by compromise some specific dispute, 
but of 1litying the foundations for a s~stem of general 
pacification. '11he lI~:pirjt of Loclii.rnoll WIitS inHtituted gS 
the perm:ment reconciJ ilitticm of France ;;;nd Germany. It 
marked tbe end of the moral isol"tion of GermliOny. It 
* Ibid - Locarno Trelitties 1925 - Grelit' Britlitin - Par1i&mentary 
Papers 1925 - Vo1.31 - cmd.2525 
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witnessed the f1nal extinction of the spirit of Vers~illes. 
The re~sons for the success of Loc~rno c~n be attri~­
uted to the negot~tions of Streseml>nn, Brhmd, lmd Ch~mber­
laln before the convokjng of t:be l-'liIct. iilhen the preliminary 
agreement had been reached they went to Loc~rno to s8ttle 
minor details ~nd to sign. Loc~rno treated the world to 
the welcome spectacle of French, Germlil.n, ~nd British states-
men in agreement for the first tit'e sjnce the outbreak of 
the Grelilt \j'iar. As iii result, there followed a period of 
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